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INTRODUCTION 
Two recent trends on a likely collision course could dramatically alter 
the employment relationship between public school districts and public 
school teachers.  Depending on one’s point of view, that change would 
strip public school teachers of due process protection or grant school 
districts important flexibility to better manage America’s failing 
schools. 
First, over the last few years, many state legislatures have adopted 
statutory schemes tying public teachers’ employment to performance 
evaluation ratings based largely on measures of student academic 
achievement, such as test scores.1  Second, over the last two decades, 
the United States Supreme Court has signaled dissatisfaction with its 
current approach to identifying property interests entitled to protection 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 and has also 
placed new limits on the extent of public employees’ constitutional 
rights.3  Disputes between teachers and school districts over 
employment decisions governed by performance-based employment 
regimes could give the Court an opportunity, should it wish to take it, to 
reverse four decades of precedent recognizing a protected property 
interest in tenured public school teachers’ employment.4 
This Article explores how that provocative result could come about.  
Part I reviews the Court’s prevailing analysis of public employees’ 
property interest in employment rooted in Board of Regents of State 
 
1. See infra Part III.A–F (describing public teacher statutory evaluation schemes in Illinois, 
Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, and Oklahoma). 
2. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477–84 (1995); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 
U.S. 748, 766–67 (2005). 
3. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (equal protection); Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (speech).  See also Ryan Keith Meyer, The United States Supreme 
Court Eliminates the “Class-of-One” Equal Protection Claim in Public Employment, 48 
WASHBURN L.J. 529, 529–30 (2009).   
4. This Article focuses on public teachers’ due process rights in employment, but the trends 
and analysis described herein could affect the due process rights of many other public employees.   
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Colleges v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann.5  Under the “Roth/Perry 
approach,” the Court determines whether an independent source of 
authority constrains official discretion to remove a public employee, 
such that the employee has a legitimate claim of entitlement to 
employment that is protected by due process. 
Part II analyzes four relatively recent Supreme Court cases.  Two of 
these cases show the Court’s discomfort with the Roth/Perry approach,  
suggest an alternative framework for determining the presence of a 
protected interest—the “atypical and significant hardship framework”—
and offer possible factors that could be used to implement that 
framework—the “incidental benefit” and “intended benefit” factors.6  
The other two cases express the Court’s increasingly narrow view of 
public employees’ constitutional rights.7  All four cases emphasize two 
themes that could be instrumental to formulating a new analysis of 
public employment as property for due process purposes: (1) deference 
to government officials; and (2) a focus on the intended scope of 
claimed constitutional protection. 
Part III surveys new performance-based statutory schemes governing 
public teachers’ employment in Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, 
Florida, and Oklahoma.  Part IV then shows how the Roth/Perry 
approach would apply to these statutory schemes, and why the Court 
could abandon that analysis in favor of the atypical and significant 
hardship framework.  Finally, Part V tests how the atypical and 
significant hardship framework could be applied in the public teacher 
employment context.  Part V also shows how the intended benefit 
factor, rather than the incidental benefit factor, could be used to 
implement the atypical and significant hardship test.  This Article 
contends that tenured teachers in the six states analyzed herein would 
not have a protected interest in employment if the Court applied the 
intended benefit factor to these statutory schemes.  Accordingly, 
abandoning the Roth/Perry approach in favor of the atypical and 
significant hardship framework could shatter forty years of settled law 
recognizing tenured teachers’ due process rights. 
 
5. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593 (1972). 
6. See infra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing Sandin v. Conner and Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales).  
As will be discussed, the incidental benefit factor would not afford due process protection to any 
interest that arises merely as an incident to the provision of a traditional government service, 
while the intended benefit factor would only recognize such protection if state officials intended 
to confer a right or benefit on a regulated person. 
7. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing Garcetti v. Ceballos and Engquist v. Oregon Department 
of Agriculture). 
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I. PREVAILING LAW: THE ROTH/PERRY APPROACH 
A. Before Roth and Perry 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution provide that the government may not deprive a person of 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”8  Accordingly, a 
threshold question when a party asserts a due process violation is 
whether the deprived interest is “liberty” or “property.”9  The 
government may not deprive a person of an interest protected by due 
process without first giving the person an opportunity for a hearing.10  
The amount of required pre-deprivation process depends on balancing 
the individual’s and government’s interests and increases to the extent 
that the balance tips in favor of the individual.11  Whether an interest is 
“property” is relevant when a government entity gives something to a 
person, such as public assistance or a job, and subsequently takes it 
away.12 
The Court’s approach to determining whether a property interest is 
protected by due process has changed over time.  Before Roth and 
Perry, the Court protected interests that it deemed were “rights” rather 
than “privileges.”13  For instance, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held 
that a public assistance recipient had a protected interest in continued 
benefits.14  The Court asserted that deprivation of public assistance 
“involves state action that adjudicates important rights.”15  In the 
Court’s view, the parties could not frame public assistance as a 
 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fifth Amendment describes the legal 
obligation of the federal government to afford its citizens due process, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses the same language as the Fifth Amendment to ensure that 
states provide due process to their residents. 
9. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 570–71. 
10. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).   
11. See id. at 333–35.  Specifically, a court must consider three factors to determine the extent 
of pre-deprivation process due to an individual: (1) the private interest affected by the 
government’s action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest and the likely added 
protection of additional procedure; and (3) the government’s interest, including the government 
function at issue and the burden imposed on the government by providing additional process.  Id. 
at 335.  
12. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance); Bd. of Regents of 
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (public employment). 
13. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261–62.  See also Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional 
Relevance of the Employer-Sovereign Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of 
Government Employees in Light of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHNS. L. REV. 
797, 799–801 (2007) (discussing due process rights of public employees). 
14. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261–62. 
15. Id. (emphasis added). 
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“privilege.”16  Therefore, the government could not terminate public 
assistance without due process.17  Six years later, however, the Court in 
Roth and Perry expressly rejected continued use of the right versus 
privilege test and set forth a new analysis to determine whether a 
government-provided interest is “property” protected by due process.18   
B. Setting the Standard: Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 
Roth replaced the standardless right versus privilege test with a new 
approach that recognized a protected property interest when state or 
local laws, rules, or policies gave a regulated person a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to a government-provided interest.19  In Roth, the Court 
held that a public university professor did not have a protected property 
interest in employment.20  The professor had a one-year appointment at 
a state university.21  The university did not rehire the professor after the 
appointment expired and did not provide him with an opportunity to 
challenge the decision.22  The professor sued, claiming that the 
university violated his due process rights.23  The Court explained that 
“property” is broader than ownership of real estate, chattels or money in 
the due process context.24  While broad, protected “property” did not 
include merely an “abstract need or desire” for, or a “unilateral 
expectation” of, a given interest.25  Rather, a person must have a 
“legitimate claim of entitlement” to an interest, reliance upon which 
“must not be arbitrarily undermined,” to receive due process 
protection.26 
The Court also explained that protected interests arose from “existing 
rules or understandings . . . that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to those benefits.”27  But, the Constitution did not 
supply those rules or understandings.28  Instead, an “independent source 
such as state law” determined whether a person had a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to an interest.29 
 
16. Id. at 262. 
17. Id. 
18. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). 
19. Id. at 577. 
20. Id. at 578. 
21. Id. at 566. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 568–69. 
24. See id. at 571–72. 
25. Id. at 577. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id.  To support its new mode of analysis, the Court reframed Goldberg, stating that the 
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The Court applied this framework to the independent sources of 
authority available in Roth: state statutes, the professor’s appointment 
letter, and administrative rules.30  Although Wisconsin statutes provided 
that professors who worked four continuous years acquired tenure, 
which entitles professors to continued employment absent just cause, 
the statutes did not address rehiring of nontenured professors with 
annual appointments.31  The professor’s appointment letter stated that 
employment was for one year and did not promise renewal.32  
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Wisconsin state universities had 
“unfettered discretion” to rehire nontenured professors on one-year 
contracts.33  Those professors were “entitled to nothing” other than a 
one-year appointment.34  Therefore, the nontenured professor in Roth 
did not have a property interest in employment protected by procedural 
due process.35 
C. Elaborating the Standard: Perry v. Sindermann 
Perry, decided the same day as Roth using the same analysis, held 
that tenured public professors, who cannot be dismissed except for 
cause, have a property interest in employment protected by due 
process.36  Additionally, professors without formal tenure nevertheless 
could have de facto tenure if state officials fostered an understanding of 
job security through informal sources of authority.37 
In Perry, a Texas state college did not rehire a professor on a one-
year employment contract and did not give the professor an opportunity 
for a hearing.38  Unlike Roth, the professor had worked at the same state 
college under four consecutive one-year contracts.39  Immediately 
 
plaintiff had had a protected interest in public assistance benefits because she had a claim of 
entitlement rooted in the state statute setting forth eligibility criteria.  Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.  
However, the Court’s reasoning in Roth was a departure from Goldberg’s right versus privilege 
analysis.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1970). 
30. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 566–67, 578. 
31. Id. at 566–67. 
32. Id. at 578. 
33. Id. at 567. 
34. Id. at 566. 
35. Id. at 578.  Roth implied that tenured state university professors had a property interest in 
employment because under state law they were “entitled to continued employment ‘during 
efficiency and good behavior.’”  Id. at 566.  The Court’s emphasis on the absence of statutory, 
contractual, or administrative requirements to rehire the nontenured professor suggested that the 
presence of just-cause provisions would create a legitimate claim of entitlement to employment 
protected by procedural due process.  See id. at 566–68. 
36. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). 
37. Id. at 600–02. 
38. Id. at 595. 
39. Id. at 594. 
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before, he had worked at two other Texas state colleges for six 
consecutive years.40  Yet, the professor did not have tenure because the 
college lacked a tenure system.41 
The professor’s nontenured status was “highly relevant” to, but not 
dispositive of, his due process claim.42  Referring to Roth, the Court 
stated: “[T]he Constitution does not require the opportunity for a 
hearing before the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher’s contract, unless 
he can show . . . that he had a ‘property’ interest in continued 
employment, despite the lack of tenure.”43  The professor’s allegations 
in Perry that the college’s faculty guide and the university system’s 
policy guidelines created a de facto tenure program were sufficient to 
create a “genuine issue as to his interest in continued employment.”44  
The Court reversed summary judgment against the professor because 
“the existence of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by 
state officials, . . . may justify [the professor’s] legitimate claim of 
entitlement to continued employment absent ‘sufficient cause.’”45 
The Court drew an analogy between the use of informal sources to 
find implied contracts between an employer and employee and to find 
implied tenure.46  Workplaces could have “an unwritten ‘common law’” 
that employees will receive job security equivalent to formal tenure.47  
The Court’s due process analysis hinged primarily on “mutually explicit 
understandings that support [an employee’s] claim of entitlement to the 
benefit.”48 
D. “Discretion Formulation” of the Roth/Perry Approach 
Many courts have employed a heuristic to apply the Roth/Perry test: 
whether a source of authority gives government officials discretion to 
deprive a person of an interest.49  This “discretion formulation” likely 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 596, 599. 
42. Id. at 599. 
43. Id. (emphasis added). 
44. Id. at 599–600. 
45. Id. at 602–03. 
46. Id. at 602. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 601. 
49. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976) (finding that because a state court 
construed state law to provide no guarantee of employment to a police officer, the police 
department had discretion to terminate the police officer, who had no property interest in his job); 
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (stating that “to have a property 
interest in a benefit” a person must “have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it” and that “our 
cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or 
deny it in their discretion”).  Gonzales suggests that the Court is ready to depart from the 
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arises from language in Roth—the professor did not have a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to employment because state officials had 
“unfettered discretion” not to hire him.50  If a government employer has 
discretion to remove an employee, then the employee cannot plausibly 
claim entitlement to employment.  Until recently, the Court used a 
similar analysis to determine the presence of a protected liberty interest 
when prisoners claimed due process violations.51 
II. REGRET AND RETRENCHMENT 
Although good law for over forty years, the Court showed discomfort 
with the Roth/Perry approach in Sandin v. Conner52 and Town of Castle 
Rock v. Gonzales.53  Conner effectively overruled use of the discretion 
formulation in the prisoner/liberty context, paving the way for a similar 
move in the public employment/property context.  Gonzales assumed an 
analytic posture at loggerheads with the Roth/Perry approach, failed 
faithfully to apply it, and imposed novel requirements for finding a 
protected property interest.  Both cases showed great deference to 
government employers and analyzed whether the asserted interest fell 
within the intended scope of due process protection.  Conner and 
Gonzales also furnish rationales for abandoning the Roth/Perry analysis 
in favor of the atypical and significant hardship test, and offer two 
possible factors to implement the atypical and significant hardship 
framework—the incidental and intended benefits factors. 
The Court also recently limited public employees’ speech and equal 
protection rights in Garcetti v. Ceballos54 and Engquist v. Oregon.55  
Ceballos and Engquist demonstrate the Court’s growing tendency to 
narrow public employees’ constitutional rights based on deference to 
government employers and a limited view of the intended scope of 
constitutional rights.  Accordingly, Ceballos and Engquist further 
support the likelihood that the Court will change its analysis of property 
for due process purposes, even (or perhaps especially) if doing so could 
diminish public teachers’ due process rights. 
 
Roth/Perry approach and provides a partial basis for a potential new mode of analysis to 
determine the presence of a protected property interest.  However, the Court purported to apply 
the Roth/Perry analysis in Gonzales and properly recited its standards.     
50. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972). 
51. See, e.g., Ky. Dep’t. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1989) (holding 
that prisoners had no protected interest in visitation rights because regulation did not restrict 
official discretion to grant or deny visitation). 
52. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).   
53. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).   
54. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
55. 553 U.S. 591 (2008).  
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A. Seeds of Regret: Dissatisfaction with Roth/Perry in Due Process 
Cases 
1. Sandin v. Conner 
In Conner, the Court expressly departed from precedent when it held 
that a state prisoner did not have a liberty interest protected by due 
process.56  A prison adjustment committee had found the prisoner guilty 
of misconduct and sentenced him to solitary confinement, refusing the 
prisoner’s request to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing.57  The 
prisoner claimed that the committee deprived him of liberty without due 
process.58  The Court disagreed, stating that it would “reexamine the 
circumstances under which state prison regulations afford inmates a 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”59 
The Court’s decision broke with a line of cases beginning in 1974, 
two years after Roth and Perry, that, similar to the discretion 
formulation, found a protected liberty interest when regulations 
constrained official discretion to deprive inmates of liberty.60  The 
Court expressed three reasons for abandoning that methodology.61  
First, the discretion formulation encouraged prisoners to find 
regulations stated in mandatory terms to support claims of entitlement, 
even when those regulations were not intended to confer rights on 
prisoners.62  Second, the discretion formulation gave state officials an 
incentive to avoid creating protected interests by crafting regulations 
that gave officials excessive discretion, which enhanced the risk of 
inconsistent and unfair treatment of inmates.63  Third, the discretion 
formulation drew federal courts into the mechanics of prison 
 
56. Conner, 515 U.S. at 487.   
57. Id. at 475–76. 
58. Id. at 476. 
59. Id. at 474 (emphasis added). 
60. Id. at 477–84. 
61. See id. at 481–84.  The Court noted, however, that “technically” it need not overrule any 
prior holdings.  Id. at 484 n.5.  According to the Court, Conner would not change the result in one 
case because the plaintiff was given all of the process required by the Constitution, and therefore 
the Court did not need to reach the question of whether a protected liberty interest existed.  Id.  
With respect to two other cases, the Court stated that it had found no liberty interest using the 
discretion formulation, implying that the outcomes in those cases would have been the same 
under the discretion formulation and the standard adopted in Conner.  See id.  The Court did not 
explain why it assumed that the standard adopted in Conner could not lead to finding a protected 
liberty interest, thereby overruling prior cases.  This lack of explanation implies that, compared to 
the discretion formulation, the Conner standard would capture a more limited range of interests 
entitled to due process protection as “liberty.” 
62. Id. at 481–82.  Put differently, the liberty interest fell outside the intended scope of the 
regulation’s protection.  See id.  
63. Id. at 482.  
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management, which harmed judicial economy and showed too little 
deference to state and local officials.64  Two of the Court’s concerns—
that a claimed interest could fall outside the intended scope of 
protection and that courts show deference to state and local officials—
are also significant factors in Gonzales,65 as well as Ceballos and 
Engquist,66 suggesting that those factors could play an important role in 
a possible new approach to determining public employees’ due process 
rights. 
The Court reverted to the approach it had used in liberty cases before 
the Roth/Perry discretion formulation: a regulation creates an interest 
protected by due process when it “imposes atypical and significant 
hardship” with respect to “the ordinary incidents of prison life.”67  The 
Court concluded that the regulation providing for solitary confinement 
did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on the prisoner 
because solitary confinement was not much harsher than general prison 
conditions.68   
The Conner approach departs from the Roth/Perry approach because 
it does not inquire whether a person has a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to an interest.  The Conner approach ignores expectancy or 
reliance and focuses solely on whether the regulation’s deprivation 
imposes atypical and significant hardship.69  In other words, the 
atypical and significant hardship framework tests whether a regulation 
that deprives a person of an interest imposes an excessive burden on 
that person in the totality of circumstances.  The Conner approach is 
problematic, however, because it requires subjective decisions about the 
nature and extent of hardship.70  The Court did not identify any 
standards to determine when a regulation is harsh enough to trigger due 
process protection.71  Accordingly, the incidental and intended benefit 
factors, as discussed in Part V, are needed to implement the atypical and 
significant hardship framework. 
Conner’s atypical and significant hardship test is not limited to the 
prisoner/liberty context.  Justice Breyer attempted to distinguish the 
property and liberty contexts, arguing that the Roth/Perry methodology 
protects reliance on an entitlement, whereas analysis of official 
 
64. Id. 
65. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing Gonzales). 
66. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing Ceballos and Engquist). 
67. Id. at 483–84. 
68. Id. at 485–86. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. at 496 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
71. See id. at 483–84 (majority opinion). 
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discretion in the prisoner/liberty context assures appropriate “absence of 
government restraint . . . that we call freedom.”72  However, he also 
acknowledged that a restraint on official discretion to impair prisoner 
liberty suggests “that the inmate will have thought that he himself, 
through control of his own behavior, could have avoided the 
deprivation” and therefore could “have believed that (in the absence of 
his misbehavior) the restraint fell outside the ‘sentence imposed’ upon 
him.”73  Thus, Justice Breyer inadvertently proved that analyzing 
official discretion in the prisoner/liberty context protected prisoners’ 
reliance interests, just as the discretion formulation protects public 
employees’ reliance on employment. 
Because the purposes behind evaluating official discretion in the 
liberty and property contexts are similar, the logic behind abandoning 
that analysis in the liberty context could be imported to the property 
context.  The Court could worry about recognizing due process rights in 
public teachers’ employment when state officials did not intend to 
confer rights on public teachers, encouraging grants of excessive 
official discretion that could be abused and judicial meddling in local 
governmental affairs.  Moreover, Conner’s atypical and significant 
hardship framework could be used to determine whether, in the totality 
of the circumstances, a regulation’s deprivation of public teachers’ 
employment is sufficiently burdensome to trigger due process 
protection. 
2. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales 
Gonzales further undermined the continued viability of the 
Roth/Perry approach.  In Gonzales, the Court held that a woman did not 
have a property interest in enforcement of a restraining order against her 
husband.74  Early in the opinion, the Court assumed an analytic posture 
fundamentally inconsistent with the Roth/Perry approach: 
We will not, of course, defer to the Tenth Circuit on the ultimate issue: 
whether what Colorado law has given respondent constitutes a 
property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That 
determination, despite its state-law underpinnings, is ultimately one of 
federal constitutional law.  “Although the underlying substantive 
interest is created by ‘an independent source such as state law,’ federal 
constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of 
 
72. Id. at 498 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
73. Id. 
74. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).  
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a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”75 
The Court acknowledged that state law created an “underlying 
substantive interest,” but it declared that federal constitutional law 
decided whether that interest was protected by due process.  This 
statement is a departure from Roth, which did not distinguish between 
substantive and constitutional interests.  Roth expressly stated that 
protected property interests are defined by independent sources of 
authority, such as state law, rather than the Constitution.76 
Consistent with that salvo, the Court paid lip service to, but did not 
faithfully apply, the Roth/Perry discretion formulation.  Colorado law 
provided that a police officer “shall use every reasonable means to 
enforce a restraining order” and “shall arrest, or . . . seek a warrant for 
the arrest of a restrained person” when the officer has probable cause to 
believe that a restrained person has violated a restraining order.77  These 
provisions cabin officers’ discretion to decline enforcement.78  
However, the Court did “not believe that these provisions of Colorado 
law truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory” because 
of a long history deferring to police officers’ discretion to make 
enforcement decisions.79  Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff 
did not have a protected interest in enforcement of the restraining order, 
notwithstanding the constraint on discretion in Colorado’s statute.80  
Similar to Conner, as well as Ceballos and Engquist,81 the Court’s 
decision reflected a belief that the claimed interest did not fall within 
the intended scope of constitutional protection and did not show 
appropriate deference to local officials. 
Other aspects of Gonzales also show discomfort with the Roth/Perry 
approach.  While the Court likely wished to avoid transforming police 
 
75. Id. at 756–57 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)) 
(emphasis added). 
76. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  See also Joel A. 
Hugenberger, Note, Redefining Property under the Due Process: Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales and the Demise of the Positive Law Approach, 47 B.C. L. REV. 773, 802 (2006).  
Moreover, the Court’s reliance on Memphis Light was misguided.  Id.  There, the Court found 
that the Constitution can give rise to a property interest protected by procedural due process if 
state law does not.  Id.  However, Memphis Light does not support the proposition that when state 
law defines a property interest, the Constitution can preempt state law and strip the state-created 
interest of protection.  Id. 
77. Gonzales, 408 U.S. at 758–59. 
78. Hugenberger, supra note 76, at 798–99. 
79. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 760. 
80. Id. at 766. 
81. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing Ceballos and Engquist). 
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protection into a fundamental right,82 it could have limited its holding to 
the context of police enforcement to avoid undercutting Roth.  
Moreover, Gonzales “reveals a deep skepticism of non-traditional forms 
of property.”83  The Court, in claiming that the enforcement of a 
restraining order “would not . . . resemble any traditional conception of 
property,”84 showed an attitude at loggerheads with Roth’s broad 
conception of property.85  Instead of limiting its holding, the Court 
dismissively marginalized an interest in a restraining order as 
“nontraditional” property,86 which also marginalized the Roth/Perry 
approach. 
Furthermore, the Court set forth two novel criteria for finding a 
protected property interest, creating additional tension with the 
Roth/Perry approach.87  First, a protected property interest must have 
“some ascertainable monetary value.”88  Second, such an interest must 
not be merely incidental to the provision of a traditional government 
service.89  According to the Court, the right to enforcement of a 
restraining order met neither criterion90—a holding that underscores its 
departure from Roth’s broad view of protected property. 
As Parts IV and V demonstrate, the Court could invoke rationales 
from Conner and Gonzales to justify discarding the Roth/Perry 
approach.  Moreover, it could derive the incidental benefit and intended 
benefit factors from Gonzales and Conner, respectively, as possible 
ways to implement Conner’s atypical and significant hardship 
framework in the property context.  In Gonzales, the Court stated that 
due process does not protect interests that arise as a mere incident to the 
provision of a traditional government service.91  Under the incidental 
benefit factor, deprivation of an interest that is merely incidental to a 
traditional government service would not impose an atypical and 
significant hardship on a due process claimant.  In Conner, the prisoner 
did not have a protected liberty interest because the regulation that 
 
82. Hugenberger, supra note 76, at 801.  Hugenberger believes that risk was limited.  See id. 
83. Id.  
84. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 766. 
85. Roth defined “property” to include everything on a continuum from “real estate, chattels 
or money” up to, but not including, an “abstract need or desire” for, or a “unilateral expectation” 
of, an interest.  Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 577 (1972). 
86. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 766 (“Such a right would not, of course, resemble any 
traditional conception of property.”). 
87. See id. at 766–67. 
88. Id. at 766. 
89. Id. at 767.  The Court’s use of this criterion is the basis for this Article’s proposed 
incidental benefit factor, discussed infra Part V. 
90. See id. at 766–67. 
91. See id.  
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created the interest was “not designed to confer rights on inmates.”92  
Under the intended benefit factor, deprivation of an interest that was not 
intended to convey a benefit or right on the claimant would not impose 
an atypical and significant hardship.  Although the incidental benefit 
factor is not consistent with the Court’s due process tradition in the 
public employment context, application of the intended benefit factor 
would strip tenured public teachers of a protected property interest in 
employment. 
B. Signs of Retrenchment: Restricting Public Employees’ 
Constitutional Rights 
Parallel to the Court’s trend away from the Roth/Perry approach, the 
Court also has limited public employees’ constitutional rights in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos93 and Engquist v. Oregon,94 perhaps 
foreshadowing a comparable limitation on public teachers’ due process 
rights.  Though not the focus of this Article, Ceballos and Engquist 
reflect themes found in Conner and Gonzales: a narrow view of the 
intended scope of constitutional rights and great deference to the 
interests of government employers.  Additionally, Ceballos and 
Engquist produced novel results that could pave the way for similar 
innovation in the procedural due process context. 
1. Speech: Garcetti v. Ceballos 
In Ceballos, the Court invoked themes reminiscent of Conner and 
Gonzales to restrict public employees’ free speech rights.  The Court 
used its traditional two-part analysis to determine whether a government 
employer’s restriction on speech violated a public employee’s First 
Amendment rights: (1) whether the public employee spoke as a citizen 
on a matter of public concern; and (2) if so, whether the employee’s 
First Amendment interest outweighed the government’s interest as 
employer.95  The Ceballos Court held that the First Amendment did not 
protect speech uttered by an assistant district attorney when he 
expressed concerns to his supervisor about an affidavit used to obtain a 
search warrant.96  Echoing Conner and Gonzales, the Court’s new 
categorical rule reflected an assumption that the First Amendment was 
not intended to protect public employees’ speech uttered during the 
course of employment: “when public employees make statements 
 
92. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995).  
93. 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (free speech).  
94. 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (equal protection).  
95. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 418. 
96. Id. at 420–21.   
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pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”97  Restricting 
such speech did not constrain any First Amendment right that a public 
employee would have as a citizen, which, the Court suggested, was the 
type of interest that the First Amendment was intended to protect.98  
Also consistent with Conner and Gonzales, limiting public 
employees’ speech uttered pursuant to official duties was a legitimate 
exercise of an employer’s prerogative to manage the workplace.99  
Subjecting such speech to the same scrutiny as citizen speech on matters 
of public concern would require judges to oversee government affairs 
“to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and 
separation of powers.”100  The Court’s emphasis on the intended scope 
of constitutional protection and deference to local government officials 
to narrow the constitutional rights at issue in Conner, Gonzales, and 
Ceballos suggests that the same themes could play a significant role in a 
future case redefining due process property rights in public 
employment. 
2. Equal Protection: Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture 
 In Engquist, the Court again demonstrated a narrow view of public 
employees’ constitutional rights and broad deference to government 
employers by holding that public employees categorically could not 
bring “class-of-one” equal protection claims.101  A former government 
employee, whose state position was eliminated, alleged under a class-
of-one theory that she was dismissed arbitrarily and with malicious 
intent.102  Generally, equal protection claims allege that a government 
actor arbitrarily treated members of a class differently than similarly 
situated people.103  However, the Court has recognized that an 
individual can claim a class-of-one equal protection violation when a 
 
97. Id. at 421.  The Court was sharply divided over this new rule, yet the majority’s reasoning 
was rooted in the Court’s two-step First Amendment balancing tradition.  The Court held in step 
one that employee speech made pursuant to job duties per se does not involve a matter of public 
concern.  Technically, the Court did not need to reach the second step, but the Court nevertheless 
balanced the assistant district attorney’s interest in speech and the government’s interest in 
management, finding in the government’s favor.  Accordingly, the Court’s analysis was 
consistent with its First Amendment tradition in public employment cases, even if the majority’s 
categorical rule was novel and controversial. 
98. Id. at 421–22. 
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 423.   
101. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008). 
102. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 595. 
103. Meyer, supra note 3, at 530. 
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government entity intentionally and without a rational basis treats the 
individual differently than similarly situated people.104  The Court had 
not suggested that the class-of-one theory was limited.105   
 Nevertheless, the Court rejected Engquist’s claim.106  The Court 
stated two principles that reflected its focus on the intended scope of 
constitutional protection and deference to government employers— 
further affirming the importance of the common principles in Conner, 
Gonzales, and Ceballos, and perhaps foreshadowing a break from the 
Roth/Perry approach.   
First, although government employees do not lose their constitutional 
rights when they accept their positions, those rights must be balanced 
against the realities of the employment context.  Second, in striking 
the appropriate balance, we consider whether the asserted employee 
right implicates the basic concerns of the relevant constitutional 
provision, or whether the claimed right can more readily give way to 
the requirements of the government as employer.107 
The Court concluded that class-of-one claims were “a poor fit for the 
public employment context,”108 in part because the Equal Protection 
Clause was not intended to protect individual public employees.109  
Moreover, the Court found that the “government has significantly 
greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when 
it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”110  In 
Engquist, government employers engaged in “discretionary 
 
104. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).  Olech sued the Village 
of Willowbrook for violation of her equal protection rights because the Village demanded that 
Olech provide a thirty-three-foot easement on her property in exchange for connection to the 
Village water supply, but only sought fifteen-foot easements from other similarly situated 
residents.  Id. at 563.   
105. See id. (“‘[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution 
through duly constituted agents.’” (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441, 
445 (1923) (emphasis added))).  One commentator has argued that Olech’s holding recognizing 
class-of-one claims “was not a change in the law” but instead was “a reminder of what had 
always been a valid cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause.”  Matthew C. Juneau, 
Surgery or Butchery?  Engquist v. Oregon, Class-of-one Equal Protection, and the Shift to 
Categorical Treatment of Public Employees’ Constitutional Claims, 70 LA. L. REV. 313, 320 
(2009).  Indeed, before Engquist, seven U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals permitted class-of-one 
claims by public employees.  See Meyer, supra note 3, at 530.  The Ninth Circuit held in 
Engquist, however, that a public employee could not bring a class-of-one claim, which created a 
circuit split before the Court took the case.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 992–
96 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 591 (2008). 
106. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 594. 
107. Id. at 600 (emphasis added). 
108. Id. at 605. 
109. Id. at 607. 
110. Id. at 599.  However, the Court did not cite Ceballos for this proposition. 
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decisionmaking” that necessarily resulted in treating similar people 
differently.111  Because those decisions were “subjective and 
individualized,”112 however, deference to the government’s interest in 
efficient management favored barring class-of-one claims by public 
employees.113 
Thus, similar to Conner, Ceballos, and Gonzales, the Court found 
that Engquist’s interest was not within the intended scope of protection 
afforded by the Equal Protection Clause and showed great deference to 
government employers.  The Court could invoke similar themes to 
justify adopting an alternative analysis to the Roth/Perry approach in 
the context of public teachers’ due process rights. 
3. Implications: Common Trend, Separate Traditions 
Ceballos and Engquist show that the seeds of regret in Conner and 
Gonzales are consistent with the Court’s trend to limit public 
employees’ constitutional rights based on a narrow construction of the 
intended scope of constitutional protections and deference to 
government employers.  Some commentators have argued that the Court 
could or should draw on Ceballos and Engquist to adopt a categorical 
rule to deny public employees a protected property interest in 
employment, but they overlook the different precedential traditions 
governing speech, class-of-one, and procedural due process claims.114  
 
111. Id. at 603.  The plaintiff in Engquist alleged that she was singled out for adverse 
treatment as compared to other similarly situated employees in her agency due to her supervisor’s 
and coworkers’ animosity toward her.  Id. at 595. 
112. Id. at 604.  The Court assumed that at-will employment was the default rule in the public 
employment context unless legislation provided otherwise.  Id. at 606.  The class-of-one theory, 
according to the Court, was inconsistent with at-will employment.  Id.  Although the Court 
acknowledged that many governments modified at-will employment to some form of just-cause 
employment, that choice was a “legislative grace.”  Id. at 607.  Because many government 
employment schemes retained at-will employment for some workers and not others, permitting 
class-of-one equal protection claims in the public employment context could upset those 
comprehensive regimes by giving at-will employees a remedy against arbitrary dismissal.  Id.  
113. See id. (“Government offices could not function if every employment decision became a 
constitutional matter.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
114. Garry observes historical parallels between the growth of public employees’ First 
Amendment and due process rights after the 1950s.  He argues that the Court “corrected” 
expansion of First Amendment rights in Ceballos and should do the same with respect to due 
process rights; thus, the Court should adopt the citizen/public employee distinction in the due 
process context.  See Garry, supra note 13, at 807.  However, historical parallels do not explain 
why reasoning rooted in the Court’s First Amendment tradition should be used in due process 
cases.  The citizen/employee distinction is consistent with First Amendment tradition, the first 
prong of which asked whether public employees spoke as citizens on matters of public concern.  
By contrast, the due process tradition never has considered the status or role of a public 
employee.  Although Gonzales suggests that the Court wishes to narrow the range of interests 
protected by due process, drawing on due process precedent, not First Amendment precedent, 
would be a more persuasive rationale for doing so. 
1_CAMILLUCCI 3/9/2013  1:31 PM 
2013] Regretting Roth 609 
Whereas the Court denied protection to public employee speech in 
Ceballos based on its First Amendment balancing tradition and adopted 
similar reasoning in Engquist due to the absence of any class-of-one 
tradition,115 procedural due process rights are governed by an 
independent tradition that does not support a per se rule denying public 
employees a protected interest in employment.116  Rather than draw on 
First Amendment and class-of-one cases, the Court could fashion a 
more persuasive justification for abandoning the Roth/Perry approach 
and developing an alternative mode of analysis from its due process 
tradition.  Part V shows that the Court could develop a new approach to 
determining the presence of a protected property interest that is rooted 
in due process precedent.  Accordingly, the Court could address its 
concerns with the Roth/Perry approach without making arbitrary 
analogies to the traditions governing other constitutional rights, such as 
free speech and equal protection. 
 
 Juneau also argues that Engquist’s categorical rule could be used to deny public employees due 
process protection.  Juneau, supra note 105, at 348–50.  According to Juneau, Engquist sought to 
prevent federal judicial involvement in a deluge of public employee claims, and the Court could 
categorically deny public employees a protected interest in employment for a similar reason.  
Although the Court has qualms about meddling with government employers’ decisions, that is not 
a persuasive basis for adopting a citizen/employee dichotomy in due process cases.  The Court’s 
effort in Engquist to show that the public employee/citizen distinction had support in due process 
precedent was misleading and unfounded.  The Court cited Bishop v. Wood for the proposition 
that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee public employees protection from dismissal.  
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 599 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976)).  That statement, 
though accurate, does not show that public employment categorically is not protected property.  
In any context, due process only guarantees an opportunity for a hearing.  Neither Bishop nor 
Engquist suggests that public employees categorically have no right to due process.  See id. at 
595.  The Court could more persuasively address concerns about deference in due process cases 
by developing an alternative framework for identifying a protected interest that is grounded in 
due process tradition.   
115. Engquist relied mostly on First Amendment cases to distinguish class-of-one claims 
brought by public employees and citizens, and to limit use of the class-of-one theory by the 
former.  Meyer, supra note 3, at 556–57.  However, even in the class-of-one context, where no 
tradition comparable to the procedural due process tradition existed, the Court’s analogy to First 
Amendment cases has been criticized because the government’s power to regulate employee 
speech is more closely related to its legitimate interest in efficient operations than its power 
arbitrarily to treat individual public employees differently than similarly-situated peers.  See id. at 
556–60. 
116. The due process tradition governing the identification of protected interests in public 
employment does not balance the interests of public employees and government employers or 
look to whether a person’s status is “public employee” or “citizen.”  Rather, it examines the 
nature of a person’s asserted interest, namely whether an independent source of authority creates 
a legitimate claim of entitlement to that interest.  See supra Part I.B–C. 
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III. SELECT STATE PERFORMANCE-BASED PUBLIC TEACHER 
EMPLOYMENT STATUTES 
Parallel to the Court’s evolving view of interests protected by due 
process and public employees’ constitutional rights, many states have 
adopted statutory schemes governing public teacher employment that 
link employment decisions to teachers’ performance evaluation 
ratings.117  Measures of a teacher’s performance must be based in large 
part on the performance of his or her students on standardized tests—the 
goal being to reward and retain teachers who contribute to student 
academic growth and remove teachers who do not.  Challenging that 
principle is difficult.  However, many teachers worry that too closely 
linking teacher performance to student performance unfairly holds 
teachers responsible for factors influencing student achievement beyond 
teachers’ control.  Perhaps because of this concern, states have devised 
varied formulas for evaluating teacher performance that incorporate 
both student test scores and other factors, such as teachers’ preparation 
and pedagogical methods. 
Disputes between public school teachers and school districts over 
adverse employment decisions made pursuant to new state regimes 
could give the Court an opportunity to reevaluate whether tenured 
public teachers’ employment is protected by due process.  This Part 
summarizes the important features of performance-based schemes in six 
states: Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, and Oklahoma.  
Together, these states offer geographic and topographic diversity, as 
well as an array of strategies to link teacher performance to 
employment.  Evaluating the statutes in these states conveys a sense of 
how legislatures representing different parts of the country have sought 
to implement performance-based systems governing public teachers’ 
employment. 
A. Illinois 
In Illinois, every school district must evaluate probationary teachers 
annually and tenured teachers biennially.118  However, a tenured 
teacher who receives ratings of “needs improvement” or 
 
117. The federal government’s Race to the Top Initiative encouraged states to develop such 
performance-based regimes.  See generally Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund 
Assessment Program; Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 
75 Fed. Reg. 68, 18171 (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-04-
09/pdf/2010-8176.pdf.  The Department of Education conditioned large grants on the 
development and implementation of systems to evaluate teacher performance and inform 
employment decisions.  Id. 
118. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(1)–(2) (West 2012). 
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“unsatisfactory” must be evaluated in the following year.119  All 
teachers in Illinois must be rated as “excellent,” “proficient,” “needs 
improvement,” or “unsatisfactory.”120  District evaluations must include 
student growth data as “a significant factor” in rating teacher 
performance.121 
Performance evaluation ratings affect teachers’ employment status.  
For instance, they determine the length of time a probationary teacher 
must work before attaining tenure status.122 Once teachers become 
tenured, performance evaluation ratings can lead to dismissal for just 
cause or on the basis of performance.123  If a tenured teacher receives a 
“needs improvement” performance rating, then the evaluator must 
create a “professional development plan” designed to improve the 
teacher’s performance.124  Similarly, if a tenured teacher receives an 
“unsatisfactory” rating and the evaluator deems the teacher’s deficits 
remediable, then the evaluator must develop a ninety-day “remediation 
plan,” upon which the evaluator will reevaluate the teacher.125  If the 
teacher receives a remediation plan rating of “needs improvement” or 
“unsatisfactory,” the evaluator may recommend dismissal of the 
teacher.126  Even if a tenured teacher obtains a remediation plan rating 
of “proficient” or better, a school may dismiss the teacher without 
another remediation plan if that teacher subsequently receives an 
“unsatisfactory” rating within the next three years.127  Additionally, a 
school district may dismiss a teacher without providing a remediation 
plan for “deficiencies which are deemed irremediable.”128  Therefore, 
although remediation plans often give tenured teachers an extra layer of 
protection against dismissal on the basis of performance ratings, 
evaluators may avoid use of remediation plans by deeming a teacher’s 
deficiencies irremediable.129 
Performance evaluation ratings also determine the order in which 
tenured teachers may be laid off and influence which tenured teachers 
 
119. Id. § 5/24A-5(2). 
120. Id. § 5/24A-5(e). 
121. Id. § 5/24A-5(c). 
122. See id. §§ 5/24-11(d)(1)–(3), 5/34-84. 
123. Id. §§ 5/34-85(a), 5/10-22.4. 
124. Id. § 5/24A-5(h).  
125. Id. § 5/24A-5(i).   
126. Id. §§ 5/24A-5(m), 5/24-16.5(b). 
127. Id. § 5/24A-5(n). 
128. Id.  See also id. § 5/24A-5(i).   
129. However, when a school district brings immediate dismissal proceedings against a 
tenured teacher for deficiencies deemed irremediable, the dismissal process appears to give the 
teacher an opportunity to correct deficiencies that in fact are remediable before those “causes” 
become “charges” that form the basis of dismissal.  See id. § 5/24-12(d)(1). 
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are recalled.  Categories of teachers with the worst performance 
evaluation ratings must be laid off before those with the best ratings.130  
Additionally, when a school district fills any vacancies, performance 
evaluation ratings must be considered, and length of service may not be 
considered except as a tie breaker.131  However, teachers are given a 
role in shaping layoff and recall procedures, in part to prevent pretextual 
dismissal of teachers with long terms of service.132 
B. Michigan 
In Michigan, teachers must be evaluated at least once at the end of 
each year.133  Teachers can be rated “highly effective,” “effective,” 
“minimally effective,” or “ineffective.”134  By the 2015–2016 school 
year, at least fifty percent of a teacher’s evaluation must be based on 
student growth assessment data from the prior three years.135  
Michigan’s scheme expressly states that the purpose of its performance 
evaluation system is to inform decisions about whether teachers are 
effective, need professional development, should receive tenure, or 
should be removed.136  Every evaluation must include teacher 
performance goals and recommended training,137 and the scheme 
includes measures to help teachers who receive low ratings.138 
As in other states, Michigan performance evaluation ratings influence 
teachers’ employment status and job security.  Probationary teachers’ 
ratings affect the length of their probationary period and whether they 
will receive tenure status.139  Tenured teachers may only be dismissed 
for “a reason that is not arbitrary or capricious.”140  Tenured teachers 
who receive an ineffective rating must show progress toward personal 
development goals during a 180-day period.141  Although the statute 
does not expressly state that failure to do so is sufficient cause for 
dismissal, the scheme does not provide for any other adverse 
consequence for failure to meet individual development goals.142  
 
130. Id. § 5/24-12(b).   
131. Id. § 5/24-1.5. 
132. Id. § 5/24-12(c). 
133. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1249(2)(a) (West 2011). 
134. Id. § 380.1249(1)(c). 
135. Id.; id. § 380.1249(2)(a)(ii). 
136. See id. § 380.1249(1)(d). 
137. Id. § 380.1249(2)(a)(iii).   
138. Id.  
139. See id. § 38.83b(1)–(2). 
140. Id. § 38.101(1).   
141. Id. § 38.93. 
142. See id. §§ 38.101, 380.1249(2)(h). 
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Accordingly, a single “ineffective” rating and failure to attain individual 
development goals would be grounds for dismissal.  Further, a school 
district must dismiss the teacher if he or she is rated “ineffective” for 
three consecutive years.143 
C. Colorado 
All public teachers in Colorado are evaluated against performance 
standards established by the state board and adopted by the general 
assembly.144 At least fifty percent of a teacher’s rating must be 
determined by the academic growth of the teacher’s students.145  The 
legislature identified five purposes for Colorado’s evaluation system: 
(1) establishing a foundation to improve instruction, (2) improving 
administration of curricula, (3) measuring and documenting teacher 
performance for dismissal purposes, (4) measuring teacher professional 
growth and development, and (5) measuring teacher effectiveness.146 
Similar to other states, a tenured teacher’s performance evaluation 
rating can lead to dismissal.  Tenured teachers may be dismissed only 
for cause, which includes “unsatisfactory performance.”147  If a tenured 
teacher receives an “ineffective” rating, the teacher may be given a 
remediation plan.148 If the teacher’s next evaluation rating is 
“ineffective,” then the evaluator may either suggest additional measures 
to improve the teacher’s performance or recommend dismissal.149 
Colorado’s performance evaluation system also influences the 
likelihood that a tenured teacher will be selected to teach at a given 
school.  Principals must consent to the assignment of a teacher to the 
principal’s school.150  If no principal consents to the placement of a 
teacher at a school after the longer of twelve months or two “hiring 
cycles,” then the school district must place the teacher on unpaid 
leave.151  However, tenured teachers on unpaid leave who received an 
“effective” rating on their most recent evaluation are given priority to 
interview for open teaching positions.152 
 
143. Id. § 380.1249(2)(h). 
144. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-106(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of First Reg. Sess. 
Gen. Assembly (2013)).  
145. Id. § 22-9-106(1)(e)(II). 
146. Id. § 22-9-106(1)(d)(I)–(V). 
147. Id. § 22-63-301. 
148. Id. § 22-9-106(4.5)(b). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(I).   
151. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV). 
152. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(III)(A). 
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D. Idaho 
Idaho also requires annual evaluations for its public teachers.153  
Similar to Colorado and Michigan, fifty percent of the total evaluation 
must be based on “objective measures of growth in student 
achievement.”154  Idaho’s statute is less specific than those in other 
states, perhaps because it authorizes the state board to promulgate 
procedures to implement the performance evaluation system.155  Unlike 
Michigan and Colorado, Idaho’s scheme does not expressly state the 
purpose of performance evaluations. 
The effect of Idaho’s scheme on public teachers’ interest in 
employment depends on the teacher’s particular contract.  Idaho school 
districts may not enter into renewable contracts that lead to the “vesting 
of tenure” or “continued expectations of employment or property rights 
in an employment relationship.”156  However, “renewable contract 
status” is “grandfathered” for teachers who achieved that status prior to 
January 31, 2011.157  Although school districts must renew the contracts 
of teachers with renewable contract status after each school year,158 the 
state board may put a teacher with renewable contract status on 
probation for “unsatisfactory performance.”159  If the teacher’s 
performance remains unsatisfactory, the board may decide not to renew 
the renewable contract.160  Additionally, upon renewal the board may 
reduce a teacher’s contract term or salary.161  The board’s authority not 
to renew renewable contracts on the basis of performance and to alter 
their essential terms undermines traditional tenure protections. 
Furthermore, Idaho school districts must employ teachers on 
“Category A” or “Category B” contracts.162  Category A contracts are 
one-year contracts for teachers in the first three years of employment;163  
Category B contracts are two-year contracts that the board may offer to 
teachers after three years of continuous employment with the same 
district.164  Though school districts need not renew Category A or B 
 
153. See IDAHO CODE § 33-514(4) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/id 
stat/Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session). 
154. Id.  
155. See id. § 33-514–33-515. 
156. Id. § 33-515(1). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. § 33-515(2).   
159. Id. § 33-515(5).   
160. Id.    
161. Id. § 33-515(7). 
162. See id. § 33-514(2)(a)–(b). 
163. Id. § 33-514(2)(a). 
164. Id. § 33-514(2)(b). 
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contracts, they must not make renewal decisions until completing 
teachers’ annual performance evaluations.165  While teachers with 
Category B contracts may request “informal review” of a decision not to 
renew their contract,166 “no new employment contract between a school 
district and a certificated employee shall result in the vesting of tenure, 
continued expectations of employment or property rights in an 
employment relationship.”167 
The Board also may dismiss teachers during a contract term for 
conduct that is grounds for revoking a teaching certificate, which is 
similar to conduct commonly enumerated in just-cause dismissal 
provisions, such as gross negligence and incompetence.168  This 
dismissal power expressly applies to teachers with grandfathered 
renewable contracts.169  Therefore, poor performance ratings can be the 
basis for dismissal of all teachers. 
E. Florida 
Florida teachers can receive ratings of “highly effective,” “effective,” 
“needs improvement,” or “unsatisfactory.”170  The purpose of the 
system is to increase “student learning growth by improving the quality 
of instructional . . . services in the public schools.”171  To that end, at 
least fifty percent of teacher evaluations must be based on student 
learning growth as demonstrated by student test scores over the prior 
three years.172 
Performance evaluation ratings greatly influence the hiring and 
contract renewal of teachers in Florida.  Florida’s scheme eschews 
traditional tenure: all teachers who complete a probationary period 
(other than some grandfathered teachers) receive one-year contracts that 
district school boards may renew annually.173  A district school board 
may not offer or renew a one-year contract unless: (1) a teacher has 
been recommended by the district superintendent and approved by the 
district board based on the teacher’s performance evaluation; and (2) a 
teacher has not received two consecutive annual performance ratings of 
“unsatisfactory,” two annual ratings of “unsatisfactory” within the prior 
three years, or three consecutive ratings of “needs improvement” or a 
 
165. Id. § 33-514(2)(a)–(b). 
166. Id. § 33-514(2)(b). 
167. Id. § 33-515(1).   
168. Id. §§ 33-513(5), 33-1208(1)–(2).   
169. Id. § 33-515(6). 
170. FLORIDA STAT ANN. § 1012.34(2)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
171. Id. § 1012.34(2)(1)(a). 
172. Id. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1), 1012.34(3)(a)(1)(a).   
173. Id. §§ 1012.33(3)–(4), 1012.335(2)(b)–(c). 
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combination of “needs improvement” and “unsatisfactory.”174  
Moreover, a single “unsatisfactory” rating can result in nonrenewal if a 
teacher does not correct his or her performance within ninety days.175  
Thus, performance ratings can preclude hiring and renewal of teachers. 
A teacher’s performance rating also can lead to removal during a 
contract term.  All contracts must provide for just-cause dismissal, 
which includes two consecutive ratings of “unsatisfactory,” two ratings 
of “unsatisfactory” within a three-year period, or three consecutive 
ratings of “needs improvement,” or a combination of “needs 
improvement” and “unsatisfactory.”176  Additionally, teachers with the 
lowest performance ratings are laid off first during layoff periods.177  
Performance evaluation ratings play an influential, if not determining, 
role in nearly every context in which a teacher could face an adverse 
employment decision. 
Florida’s scheme includes vague provisions that could permit 
teachers to improve their skills and avoid removal for poor performance 
ratings.  By leaving the details to local school districts, this scheme 
makes the effectiveness of any professional development difficult to 
evaluate.  The evaluation system must “provide appropriate instruments, 
procedures and criteria for continuous quality improvement of the 
professional skills of instructional personnel.”178  Teachers with 
“unsatisfactory” ratings must receive suggestions for improvement and 
assistance to correct performance problems before an evaluator may 
recommend dismissal.179  Finally, teachers have some role in 
determining performance standards: the education commissioner must 
consult with experts and stakeholders, including teachers, about the 
criteria used to determine performance levels.180 
F. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma requires school districts to evaluate probationary teachers 
biannually and tenured teachers annually.181  The purpose of the 
evaluation system is to “provide feedback to improve student learning 
and outcomes.”182  Teachers can receive the following ratings: 
“superior,” “highly effective,” “effective,” “needs improvement,” or 
 
174. Id. §§ 1012.335(2)(b)–(c), 1012.33(3)(a)–(b). 
175. Id. § 1012.34(4)(b)(2). 
176. Id. § 1012.33(1)(a). 
177. Id. § 1012.33(5).   
178. Id. § 1012.34(2)(b).   
179. Id. § 1012.34(4)(a), (b)(2).   
180. Id. § 1012.34(2)(e).   
181. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-101.10(A)(4)–(5) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
182. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(2). 
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“ineffective.”183  Thirty-five percent of each rating must be based on 
quantitative data of student academic growth; fifteen percent must be 
based on quantitative data of other academic measures;184 and the other 
half of each rating must be based on qualitative factors correlated to 
student performance.185 
Probationary teachers’ ratings determine the length of the 
probationary period preceding tenure status.186  Additionally, if a 
probationary teacher does not receive a minimum specified combination 
of ratings over a four-year period, the teacher will not receive tenure 
status unless a principal petitions the superintendent.187  A probationary 
teacher who does not receive tenure after four years or who receives two 
consecutive “ineffective” ratings must be dismissed.188 
Tenured teachers—who can be dismissed only for enumerated 
reasons, including “instructional ineffectiveness”189—can be removed 
based on performance ratings in two ways.  First, tenured teachers must 
be dismissed or must not have their contracts renewed after receiving 
two consecutive “ineffective” ratings, three consecutive “needs 
improvement” ratings or lower, or an average rating over a five-year 
period of less than “effective.”190 Second, administrators have 
discretion to seek removal if they detect “poor performance or conduct 
that the administrator believes may lead to a recommendation” for 
dismissal or nonrenewal.191 
However, Oklahoma’s performance evaluation process includes some 
features designed to help teachers achieve higher ratings and avoid 
removal.  Performance evaluations must include remediation plans and 
“instructional coaching” for teachers who receive “needs improvement” 
or “ineffective” ratings.192  Additionally, school administrators must 
make a “reasonable effort” to help teachers improve and must give the 
teacher “reasonable time” (not to exceed two months) to make 
improvements.193  If a teacher fails to improve, then the administrator 
must make a recommendation to dismiss the teacher.194 
 
183. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(1). 
184. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(4)(a). 
185. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(4)(b), (B)(5). 
186. See id. § 6-101.3(4)(b)(1)–(2). 
187. Id. § 6-101.3(4)(b)(3). 
188. Id. § 6-101.22(D)(1)–(2). 
189. Id. § 6-101.22(A). 
190. Id. § 6-101.22(C)(1)–(3). 
191. Id.; § 6-101.24(C). 
192. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(3).   
193. Id. § 6-101.24(A).   
194. Id. 
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G. Statutory Features Relevant to Intended Benefit Factor 
Certain characteristics of the state schemes described above are 
particularly relevant to Part V’s intended benefit factor analysis.  In all 
states, teachers can only be removed for cause, not at will.  
Additionally, most states offer teachers professional development 
opportunities that, to varying extents, enhance teachers’ skills and 
afford a measure of job security.  Illinois gives teachers a role in 
shaping the layoff and recall process.  Colorado’s scheme permits de 
facto dismissal of teachers by allowing principals to refuse teacher 
assignments.  Idaho teachers with grandfathered renewable contracts 
have a diluted right to renewal of those contracts, yet the Idaho 
legislature expressly stated its intent not to confer due process rights on 
teachers.  Most importantly, all states make student performance a 
significant, if not primary, factor in teachers’ performance evaluation 
ratings. 
IV. ESTABLISHING, AND JUSTIFYING DEPARTURE FROM, THE BASELINE 
Conner and Gonzales show that the Court is moving away from the 
Roth/Perry approach, and demonstrate the Court’s parallel trend of 
limiting public employees’ constitutional rights.  This Part shows that 
the Court could draw on Conner and Gonzales to develop a new 
approach to evaluating public teachers’ interest in employment and 
thereby limit their due process rights. 
First, this Part examines how the Roth/Perry approach would apply to 
the state performance-based public teacher employment schemes in 
Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, and Oklahoma.  That 
analysis provides a baseline to understand how the Court’s possible new 
approach could shatter the prevailing understanding of tenured public 
teachers’ due process rights.  Next, this Part explores three rationales 
derived from Conner and Gonzales that could justify abandoning the 
Roth/Perry framework: (1) the Roth/Perry approach wastes judicial 
resources and undermines proper deference to state and local officials; 
(2) the discretion formulation encourages laws and regulations that do 
not treat people uniformly and fairly; and (3) federal constitutional law, 
not state law, should determine whether an interest is entitled to due 
process protection. 
A. The Baseline: Teachers’ Procedural Due Process Rights under 
Roth/Perry 
The Roth/Perry approach examines independent sources of authority, 
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such as state law, to determine whether an individual has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to an interest.195  If a court finds that a source of 
authority constrains official discretion to deprive a person of an interest, 
then the person is entitled to due process.196  However, if a government 
official has discretion to deprive a person of an interest, then the person 
is not entitled to due process.197 
To apply the Roth/Perry approach to tenured teachers’ employment 
interest under the statutory schemes in Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, 
Florida, Idaho, and Oklahoma, a court would identify any provisions 
that could give rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to employment 
and determine whether officials have discretion to deprive tenured 
public teachers of employment.  The subsequent Subsections examine 
just-cause dismissal provisions in all six states, as well as other 
dismissal and renewal provisions in Idaho and Florida.  Under the 
Roth/Perry approach, tenured public teachers in all six states have a 
protected interest in employment with respect to dismissal.  Tenured 
teachers in Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, and Oklahoma also have a 
protected interest in contract renewal.  Tenured teachers in Idaho only 
have a weak protected interest in renewal, entitling them to less robust 
process before dismissal.  Florida public teachers have no interest in 
renewal and no corresponding due process protection against contract 
nonrenewal. 
1. Just-Cause Dismissal Provisions 
In Roth, a professor at a public college did not have a protected 
property interest in employment because no independent source of 
authority limited his dismissal or nonrenewal to just cause.198  The 
professor had no legitimate claim of entitlement to employment that 
gave him a property interest in contract renewal because the professor’s 
employment could be terminated at the college’s discretion.199  By 
contrast, in Perry, a teacher’s manual and policy guidelines suggested 
that professors employed for a minimum number of years would not be 
deprived of employment except for cause.200  Accordingly, the 
professor in Perry may have had a property interest in contract renewal.  
Therefore, under the Roth/Perry analysis, if an independent source of 
authority generally limits removal of a public teacher to just cause, the 
 
195. See supra Part I.B–C. 
196. See supra Part I.B–C. 
197. See supra Part I.D. 
198. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). 
199. Id. 
200. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600–01 (1972). 
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teacher has a protected property interest in employment with regard to 
dismissal and nonrenewal. 
Statutory schemes in Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, 
and Oklahoma each limit dismissal of tenured teachers to just cause.  
All of these provisions limit official discretion to terminate the 
employment of tenured teachers absent certain grounds.201  
Accordingly, under the Roth/Perry approach, teachers in all six states 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to employment with respect to 
dismissal within a contract term, and teachers in all states but Idaho and 
Florida have an equivalent protected interest in contract renewal.  To 
that extent, the new statutory schemes do nothing to reduce tenured 
teachers’ right to due process under the Roth/Perry approach.202 
2. Dismissal vs. Renewal: Idaho and Florida 
The schemes in Idaho and Florida distinguish between a school 
district’s authority to dismiss a teacher during a contract term and to not 
renew a teacher’s contract upon expiration.  Under the Roth/Perry 
approach, teachers in Idaho have a lesser property interest in 
employment with respect to contract renewal than dismissal, which in 
turn entitles those teachers to less robust due process protection.  
Teachers in Florida have no property interest in renewal, which gives 
them no due process right to challenge nonrenewal of a contract. 
 
201. Schemes that make performance ratings a possible basis for just-cause dismissal and 
remove seniority as a criterion relevant to certain employment decisions may be perceived as 
weakening the protection given to teachers, thereby reducing the extent to which those teachers 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to employment.  As applied to teachers who have seniority 
but who do not receive good performance evaluation ratings, performance-based schemes may 
not assure secure employment, especially compared to regimes that favor senior teachers.  
However, that is irrelevant to the Roth/Perry analysis of whether an independent source of 
authority creates a protected interest in employment.  The six schemes discussed in this Article 
have just-cause dismissal provisions that conceptually are no different than the just-cause 
dismissal provisions at issue in Roth and Perry: they limit official discretion to dismiss teachers.  
Although many of the new schemes have added performance ratings as a basis for dismissal, they 
still do not give officials greater discretion to dismiss teachers.  In fact, adding performance as a 
basis for dismissal may cabin official discretion more than the vague epithets often used to 
describe “just cause,” such as “neglect of duty.”  Accordingly, for the purpose of Roth/Perry 
analysis, dismissal provisions that define “cause” to include “performance” constrain official 
discretion to dismiss teachers and therefore give rise to a protected property interest in 
employment. 
202. However, in states such as Florida, where teachers must have one-year contracts that 
district school boards have discretion to renew each year, procedural due process protection 
triggered by dismissal during a contract term is less significant.  A school district effectively can 
remove a teacher without implicating procedural due process safeguards by waiting for a 
teacher’s contract to expire and then opting not to renew it.  See infra Part IV.A.2.ii.  See also 
infra Part IV.A.2.i (discussion of discretionary renewal in Idaho). 
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i. Idaho 
Although an Idaho school board may dismiss a teacher during a 
contract term solely for cause,203 it has discretion not to renew a teacher 
working under a Category A or B contract, provided that no decision 
about renewal may be made until after a teacher’s performance 
evaluation is complete.204  This condition implies that a school board 
must take into account a teacher’s performance rating before making a 
renewal decision.  Otherwise, the provision conditioning contract 
renewal decisions on the completion of a teacher’s performance 
evaluation would be superfluous.  Although the statute does not state 
what performance ratings would prevent a school board from deciding 
not to renew a teacher’s contract,205 the implied constraint at minimum 
must preclude a school board from not renewing the contract of a 
teacher who received the highest possible rating.  Therefore, Idaho’s 
scheme impliedly constrains official discretion and creates some 
property interest in employment relating to renewal of Category A and 
B contracts, albeit a weaker interest than teachers’ interest in 
employment for dismissal purposes.  Accordingly, under the Roth/Perry 
approach, teachers with Category A or B contracts whose contracts are 
not renewed are entitled to an opportunity for a hearing.  The extent of 
that hearing, however, depends on balancing teachers’ interest in 
employment against the government’s interest in administering the 
schools.206 
The Idaho Code attempts to withhold any property interest in renewal 
of Category A or B contracts, but that effort is ineffective under the 
Roth/Perry approach.  Under Idaho law, no property rights attach to 
Category A and B contracts and employees have no right to formal 
review of a board’s decision not to renew such contracts.207  However, 
in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that “‘[p]roperty’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided for 
its deprivation.”208  In Loudermill, a school board argued that the 
statutory procedures governing termination of employment could 
 
203. IDAHO CODE § 33-513(5) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/ 
Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session); id. § 33-1208(1)–(2). 
204. Id. § 33-514(2)(a)–(b). 
205. See id. 
206. Here, the constraint on official discretion is implied and the scope of that constraint may 
be narrow.  Therefore, an individual teacher’s property interest in employment would be 
relatively weak.  By comparison, the government’s interest in effectively managing its school 
system is strong.  Accordingly, Idaho teachers probably would not be entitled to a robust pre-
deprivation hearing in the contract nonrenewal context. 
207. Id. 
208. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).  
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narrow the scope of a school security guard’s property interest in 
employment, which substantively only could be terminated for just 
cause.209  The Court rejected that reasoning because the Due Process 
Clause’s protection of property “would be reduced to a mere tautology” 
if “[t]he categories of substance and procedure are distinct.”210  Once a 
statute creates a substantive property interest in employment by limiting 
dismissal to cause, then procedural provisions cannot limit the extent of 
due process required by the Constitution.211  Accordingly, Idaho’s 
provision purporting to prohibit teachers from challenging nonrenewal 
of a contract cannot deprive teachers of due process rights arising from 
their substantive property interest in employment, which derives from 
the implied constraint on official discretion not to renew Category A 
and B contracts. 
The Idaho Code also seeks to withhold a property interest by labeling 
teachers’ interest in contract renewal as “not property.”212  Some 
scholars believe that state legislatures may label an interest as “not 
property” for procedural due process purposes.213  However, permitting 
states to withhold a property interest in employment solely by resort to 
labels is inconsistent with Loudermill’s command that the hallmark of 
the Roth/Perry analysis is whether an independent source of authority 
creates a substantive interest in employment by constraining official 
discretion.214  Furthermore, labeling an interest in contract renewal as 
“not property” contradicts the Court’s pronouncement in Gonzales that 
“although the underlying substantive interest is created by an 
independent source, such as state law, federal constitutional law 
determines whether the interest rises to the level of a legitimate claim of 
entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.”215  Following this 
 
209. Id. at 540. 
210. Id. at 541. 
211. Id. 
212. See IDAHO CODE § 33-514(2)(a) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/id 
stat/Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session) (“No property rights shall attach 
to a category A contract . . . .”); id. § 33-514(2)(b) (“No property rights shall attach to a category 
B contract . . . .”). 
213. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 
1044, 1091–92 (1984) (“As Bishop v. Wood made clear, federal requirements could be negated if 
state law were interpreted to have created no property rights. . . .  Thus, as long as the Court 
insists that due process protection requires a property interest and that state law is the only 
standard for property, it is virtually committed to accepting the state’s control over the content of 
due process protection.” (internal citation omitted)). 
214. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. 
215. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although this Article argues that Gonzales signals a shift away from 
the Roth/Perry analysis and supplies a factor that could be used by the Court to introduce a new 
mode of analysis for determining the presence of a protected property interest, Gonzales did not 
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logic, Idaho cannot create a substantive property interest in contract 
renewal and simultaneously declare that teachers have no property 
interest in contract renewal without usurping the Court’s role to decide 
whether the substantive interest is “property” entitled to due process 
protection.216 
In contrast to teachers with Category A or B contracts, Idaho teachers 
with grandfathered renewable contracts have a statutory “right” to 
contract renewal,217 which confers a more definite claim of entitlement 
to employment for renewal purposes.  However, Idaho’s statutory 
scheme also gives a school board discretion to renew such contracts at 
lower pay rates and for shorter terms.218  As a result, any “right to 
renewal” is of uncertain value, which undercuts the reliance interest of 
teachers with renewable contract status.  Thus, under the Roth/Perry 
approach, while teachers on renewable contracts have some property 
interest in employment for the purpose of contract renewal, the Idaho 
Code reduces the intensity of that interest, which may reduce the 
amount of process due upon nonrenewal. 
ii. Florida 
Florida’s scheme denies teachers any protected property interest in 
employment for purposes of contract renewal.  Teachers who have 
completed a probationary period and meet certain criteria may be given 
annual contracts.219  Although a district school board must have just 
cause to dismiss a teacher during an annual contract term,220 it may 
choose not to grant or renew annual contracts for any reason.221  
Accordingly, district school boards have discretion to deprive teachers 
of employment through nonrenewal.222  Thus, Florida teachers with 
annual contracts have neither a property interest in contract renewal nor 
a right to due process before nonrenewal. 
 
overrule Roth or Perry and purported to apply the Roth/Perry analysis.  Accordingly, any effort to 
evaluate whether, under the Roth/Perry analysis, the Idaho Code creates a property interest in 
employment with regard to the renewal of teacher contracts must not ignore the dicta in Gonzales. 
216. See id. 
217. IDAHO CODE § 33-515(2). 
218. Id. § 33-515(3). 
219. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.335(c)(2) (West 2011).  
220. Id. § 1012.335(4). 
221. Id. § 1012.335(1)(a). 
222. Indeed, Florida’s scheme only limits local school boards’ discretion to renew, as opposed 
to not renew, a teacher’s contract.  A district school board may not renew an annual contract 
unless the district superintendent supports the teacher’s candidacy and the teacher received 
certain combinations of performance ratings over the course of the immediate prior two- or three- 
year period.  Id. §§ 1012.33(3)(a)–(b), 1012.335(2)(b)–(c). 
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B. Justifying a Departure from Roth/Perry: Three Regrets (Rationales) 
Under the Roth/Perry approach, tenured teachers in all six states 
examined in this Article have a protected property interest in 
employment with respect to dismissal.223  Tenured teachers in five of 
these states, excluding Idaho, also would have a protected interest in 
employment with regard to contract renewal.224  However, in Conner 
and Gonzales the Court signaled an inclination to depart from the 
Roth/Perry analysis;225 the Court sounded similar themes in the course 
of restricting public employees’ speech and equal protection rights in 
Ceballos and Engquist, respectively.226  Conner and Gonzales offer 
three rationales that the Court could use to discard the Roth/Perry 
analysis in the context of public teachers’ due process claims. 
1. Roth/Perry Is Not Properly Deferential to State and Local Officials 
In Conner, the Court discarded an analysis similar to the Roth/Perry 
approach and reverted to its prior method of determining the presence of 
a protected interest in the prisoner/liberty context: whether a regulation 
causing deprivation of that interest imposed an “atypical and significant 
hardship” on the regulated person.227  In part, the Court was concerned 
that scrutiny of prison regulations for any constraints on official 
discretion did not show “appropriate deference to state officials trying 
to manage a volatile environment.”228  The Gonzales Court showed a 
similar concern when it deferred to police officers’ historic enforcement 
discretion, notwithstanding statutory constraints on officers’ discretion 
to make enforcement decisions.229 
The Court’s reasoning in Conner can be exported from the 
prisoner/liberty context.  The purpose behind the official discretion 
analysis in the liberty and property contexts is similar: to protect 
reliance on an interest subject to deprivation by the government.230  
Moreover, the Court’s reluctance in Conner to second-guess prison 
officials in the liberty context is equally applicable to government 
employers in the property context.  The discretion formulation requires 
courts to stand in the shoes of government employers to determine 
whether their actions were subject to, and complied with, any 
 
223. See supra Part III.A–F. 
224. See supra Part IV.A.2.i (discussing discretionary renewal in Idaho). 
225. See supra Part II.A.1–2. 
226. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
227. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995). 
228. Id. at 482. 
229. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–58 (2005).   
230. Conner, 515 U.S. at 497–98. 
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constraints on discretion.  Accordingly, applying the Roth/Perry 
approach in the public employment context shows little deference to 
state and local officials who, like the prison officials in Conner, are 
responsible for managing large facilities serving many people, often 
under difficult circumstances.  Considering also the Court’s deference 
to government employers in Ceballos and Engquist, concern about 
deference could be a contributing factor that persuades the Court to 
replace the Roth/Perry analysis with another method for determining the 
presence of a protected interest in the property/public employment 
context. 
2. Roth/Perry Encourages Regulations that Treat People Unequally 
and Unfairly 
In Conner, the Court expressed a second qualm with the Roth/Perry 
approach that also could be invoked in the public employment context: 
it creates a perverse incentive to vest excessive discretion in state and 
local officials who might use that discretion to treat regulated persons 
unfairly.231  In part because of this possible influence on regulations 
defining the authority of prison officials, the Court stopped using the 
discretion formulation in the prisoner/liberty context and reverted to the 
atypical and significant hardship framework.232 
The Court’s rationale in Conner also can be used to justify discarding 
the Roth/Perry approach in the employment of public teachers.  As 
discussed, Conner need not be limited to the prisoner/liberty context.233  
Moreover, although the Court in Conner cited no evidence that state 
prison officials in fact received excessive discretion due to the Court’s 
use of the discretion formulation,234 some state public teacher 
employment schemes contain evidence that the Roth/Perry approach 
actually influenced legislative decisions about how: (1) to regulate 
public teachers’ employment generally; and (2) to grant education 
officials discretion to impede public teachers’ due process rights in 
employment.  Therefore, the perverse influence of the discretion 
formulation could prompt the Court to replace the Roth/Perry approach 
with the atypical and significant hardship standard in the public teacher 
employment context, just as it did in the prison/liberty context. 
i. Evidence of Roth/Perry’s General Influence on State Legislatures 
The Roth/Perry approach likely influenced schemes governing 
 
231. Conner, 515 U.S. at 482. 
232. Id. at 482–84. 
233. See supra Part II.A.1 (summarizing Conner). 
234. See id. at 482. 
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teacher employment in Oklahoma, Idaho, and Colorado.  For instance, 
the Oklahoma legislature believed that the Roth/Perry approach 
required the state to provide due process to “career teachers” before 
termination.235  One provision states that teachers “shall be entitled to 
all rights guaranteed under the circumstances by the United States 
Constitution.”236  Another provision defines “career teacher 
pretermination hearing” in part as an opportunity “to ensure that the 
career teacher is afforded the essential pretermination due process 
requirements of notice and an opportunity to respond.”237  Although the 
Oklahoma legislature did not respond to the Roth/Perry approach by 
expanding official discretion over teachers’ employment, the 
Roth/Perry approach clearly influenced the provision requiring due 
process for “career teachers” who have a legitimate claim of entitlement 
to employment. 
Additionally, the Colorado legislature wished to limit the number of 
teachers who could claim due process rights in employment under the 
Roth/Perry approach.  A requirement that school districts give 
probationary teachers the reasons for contract nonrenewal does “not 
create any property right or contract right, express or implied.”238  The 
Colorado legislature apparently worried that providing reasons for 
nonrenewal could be construed as a constraint on official discretion not 
to renew a contract, thereby creating a protected property interest in 
employment. 
The Idaho Code demonstrates even greater trepidation that teachers 
could be entitled to procedural due process under the Roth/Perry 
approach.  Idaho’s scheme expressly attempts to disclaim that Category 
A and B teachers have no property interest in employment and therefore 
have no due process rights.239  Idaho legislators sought to preclude 
application of the Roth/Perry approach and thereby reduce the number 
of due process claims.240 
 
235. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-101.3(6) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.) (effective July 
1, 2012); id. § 70-6-101.26(A). 
236. Id. at § 70-6-101.26(A) (emphasis added). 
237. Id. at § 6-101.3(6) (emphasis added). 
238. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-203(4)(b)(II) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of First 
Reg. Sess. Gen. Assembly (2013)).  However, such statements disclaiming no property right are 
inconsistent with the Court’s pronouncement in Gonzales that federal constitutional law 
determines whether a substantive interest created by state law merits procedural due process 
protection.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
239.  IDAHO CODE §§ 33-514(2)(a)–(b), 33-515(1) (2012), available at http://www.legislature. 
idaho.gov/idstat/Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session).  
240. As discussed, under the Roth/Perry approach, Idaho legislators may not have been 
successful in their effort to limit teachers’ property interest in employment and corresponding 
procedural due process rights.  However, as will be discussed, if the Court were to apply the 
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ii. Evidence that Roth/Perry Induced Legislators to Grant Official 
Discretion 
The Roth/Perry analysis also may have induced the Colorado 
legislature to expand official discretion over decisions that have an 
effect equivalent to dismissal.  Principals have discretion to reject 
teachers nominated to fill vacant positions.241  After the longer of 
twelve months or two “hiring cycles,” school districts must place 
teachers who are rejected on unpaid leave.242  The practical result of a 
principal’s discretion to reject placement of a teacher can be similar to 
dismissal.243 
Because a principal’s rejection of a teacher does not necessarily 
deprive that teacher of employment,244 rejection may not trigger a due 
process issue.  However, if rejection leads to unpaid leave and 
effectively deprives a teacher of employment, the teacher does not have 
a protected property interest in school placement because principals 
have discretion to reject teacher placements.  Consistent with the 
Court’s concern in Conner, nothing prevents a principal from exercising 
this discretion unfairly.  The Court could conclude that the Roth/Perry 
approach encouraged granting excessive discretion to Colorado 
principals to avoid creating due process rights.  To remove that perverse 
incentive, the Court could decide to replace the Roth/Perry approach 
with Conner’s atypical and significant hardship standard. 
Similarly, the Court could find that the Roth/Perry approach caused 
Idaho legislators to provide local officials with excessive discretion to 
avoid creating due process rights.  Teachers with grandfathered 
renewable contracts have a right to contract renewal,245 but school 
district boards have discretion to reduce the salary and duration of a 
renewed contract.246  Although reducing the salary or term of a contract 
is not necessarily equivalent to nonrenewal, such actions deprive 
teachers of economic value.  Moreover, significant reduction in salary 
could force a teacher not to accept a renewal offer, effectively giving 
the board discretion to remove teachers.  Because the board has 
discretion to reduce salaries, teachers could not claim a protected 
 
intended benefit factor to determine the presence of a protected property interest in employment, 
teachers in all states examined in this Article other than Illinois would not be entitled to 
procedural due process protection of employment.  See infra Part V. 
241. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(I). 
242. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV). 
243. See id. 
244. See id. §§ 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(III)(A), 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV). 
245. IDAHO CODE § 33-515(2).   
246. Id. § 33-515(3). 
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property interest in compensation.  Accordingly, the Court could find 
that the Roth/Perry approach induced the Idaho legislature to grant 
excessive official discretion over renewal decisions for the purpose of 
preventing teachers from having due process rights.  For that reason, the 
Court could set aside the Roth/Perry analysis. 
In sum, the Court’s primary concern in Conner—that a focus on 
official discretion created a perverse incentive to give state and local 
officials excessive discretion for the purpose of avoiding the creation of 
due process rights—is at least as valid in the public teacher employment 
context as it is in the prison context.  The Court reasonably could find 
that it should abandon the Roth/Perry approach to eliminate that 
incentive. 
3. Roth/Perry Undercuts the Primacy of Federal Constitutional Law 
In Gonzales, the Court justified its holding that state law did not 
create a protected property interest in enforcement of a restraining order 
in part by announcing that federal constitutional law, not state law, 
determines whether the Due Process Clause protects a property 
interest.247  That novel idea is inconsistent with Roth and Perry, which 
held that state law creates substantive property interests protected by 
procedural due process.248 
The Court could use the primacy of federal constitutional law as 
another reason to replace the Roth/Perry approach with the atypical and 
significant hardship standard.  Gonzales presented an atypical fact 
pattern, but the Court did not limit its decision to the facts at issue.249  
Moreover, Gonzales showed discomfort with a broad conception of 
property that suggests unease with the Roth/Perry approach 
generally.250  Therefore, the principle that the Constitution determines 
whether an interest created by state law is protected by due process 
could be invoked by the Court to discard the Roth/Perry approach in the 
public employment context. 
The Gonzales rationale also positions the Court to apply the atypical 
and significant hardship framework.  If federal constitutional law 
decides whether an interest created by state law is protected, then the 
question of whether a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement under 
the Roth/Perry approach is irrelevant.251  The Court would need a way 
 
247. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005). 
248. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  See also 
Hugenberger, supra note 76, at 801. 
249. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 756–57. 
250. See Hugenberger, supra note 76, at 800–01. 
251. The Court in Gonzales avoided the claimant’s legitimate claim of entitlement to police 
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to decide whether federal constitutional law recognizes due process 
protection,252 and the atypical and significant hardship framework could 
furnish that method. 
V. A NEW APPROACH AND A NEW REALITY: SHATTERING ASSUMPTIONS 
ABOUT TEACHERS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Conner suggested an analytic framework that could replace the 
Roth/Perry approach in cases involving property interests under the Due 
Process Clause: whether an independent source of authority that 
deprives a regulated party of a property interest imposes an atypical and 
significant hardship on that party.253  Additionally, Conner and 
Gonzales suggested two factors—the intended benefit factor and 
incidental benefit factor, respectively—that could be used to implement 
the atypical and significant hardship framework.254  The Court could 
use these factors to assert the primacy of federal constitutional law in 
determining the presence of a protected property interest in tenured 
teacher employment. 
Although the incidental benefit factor is inconsistent with the Court’s 
procedural due process tradition in the public employment setting, if the 
Court applied the intended benefit factor to the circumstances of 
teachers working under performance-based employment schemes in 
Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, and Oklahoma, tenured 
public teachers in these states would not have a protected property 
interest in employment. 
A. An Alternative to Roth/Perry: “Atypical and Significant Hardship” 
In Conner, the Court abandoned an analysis similar to the Roth/Perry 
approach in the prisoner/liberty context and instead focused on whether 
a regulation “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”255 
Conner’s framework may be used when a party claims a protected 
property interest.  Admittedly, prison regulations differ from statutes 
governing public teachers’ employment.  Prison regulations impair 
 
protection by declaring that state law did not actually require police officers to enforce restraining 
orders, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute.  Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 765–66. 
252. Perhaps sensing that need, the Court used two novel factors in Gonzales: (1) a protected 
property interest must have a monetary value; and (2) a protected property interest must not be 
incidental to the provision of a traditional government service.  Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 766–67. 
However, neither of those factors is relevant to the Court’s possible new approach in the public 
teacher employment setting.  
253. See supra Part II.A.1. 
254. For a discussion of these factors, see infra Part V.B.1–2. 
255. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 
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prisoners’ actual liberty, which the Due Process Clause expressly 
protects.  By contrast, employment statutes implicate the Due Process 
Clause less directly because public employment only sometimes is 
“property.”   Roth synthesized the Court’s prior holdings and fashioned 
a mode of analysis to determine when an interest in public employment 
was “property,” but the idea that due process sometimes should protect 
public employment was not novel.256 
Thus, Conner’s atypical and significant hardship framework is a 
possible alternative to the Roth/Perry approach in the property/public 
employment context.  The atypical and significant hardship framework 
recognizes a protected liberty interest when a regulation excessively 
burdens an individual’s liberty interest with respect to the totality of the 
circumstances.  Similarly, the Court could inquire whether a state 
statute authorizing removal of tenured public teachers burdens teachers’ 
interest in employment so excessively in the totality of circumstances 
that it triggers due process protection. 
Application of this framework would rely on subjective judgments.  
From a teacher’s perspective, a statute that provides for dismissal or 
nonrenewal on the basis of performance evaluation ratings—founded 
substantially on student test scores influenced in part by factors beyond 
the teacher’s control—could impose an atypical and significant hardship 
on the teacher’s employment interest.  That is to say, the most dedicated 
and well-prepared teachers could have difficulty improving student test 
scores.  Accordingly, making those scores a significant factor in job 
security could impose an excessive burden.  Conversely, school 
 
256. Even before Roth the Court recognized that public employment could be “property” for 
due process purposes, especially when dismissal was “arbitrary.”  See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of 
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972) (citing Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 
551, 559 (1955)) (holding that although a tenured professor at a public college may not have a 
constitutional right to his job, his discharge for invoking his Fifth Amendment right not to 
incriminate himself in response to questions about his affiliation with the Communist Party, 
without inquiry into professor’s fitness as employee, violated the Due Process Clause’s protection 
against “arbitrary action”); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (holding that 
dismissal of public employees for failure to take a loyalty oath was an “assertion of arbitrary 
power” that violated the Due Process Clause because the oath did not distinguish between 
innocent and knowing association with organizations on Attorney General’s list)).  Although 
Slochower and Wieman could be viewed as anomalous attempts by the Court to protect 
employees from becoming victims of the “red scare,” both decisions recognized that public 
employees had an interest in employment sufficient to protect them from “arbitrary” dismissal.  
Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191; Slochower, 350 U.S. at 559.  Moreover, Roth broadened application of 
those cases to public employment generally by recognizing the principle that public employees 
have an interest that “proscrib[es] summary dismissal from public employment without hearing or 
inquiry required by due process.”  Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (quoting Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 
U.S. 207, 208 (1970)).  Ironically, those early cases’ protection of public employees from 
arbitrary adverse decisions greatly resembles the class-of-one claim in Engquist, which the Court 
held was incompatible with the public employment setting.  See id. at 576–77. 
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administrators might believe that the state’s interest in improving 
student outcomes and reducing administrative costs justifies using 
student test scores to evaluate teachers.  Additionally, they could show 
that in most settings, employment is at will, and employers evaluate 
employees according to standards developed solely by employers.  By 
contrast, under all of the statutory schemes discussed in this Article, 
public teachers retain some job security and, under most of those 
schemes, teachers have a degree of input during the performance 
evaluation process.  From this perspective, linking public teachers’ 
employment to performance evaluation ratings does not impose atypical 
and significant hardship. 
Balancing the subjective perspectives of teachers and education 
officials in a fair and principled manner is an inherent difficulty of the 
atypical and significant hardship framework.  To mitigate this problem, 
the Court could use the incidental benefit and intended benefit factors to 
focus on specific facts relevant to whether regulations permitting 
removal based on performance are excessively burdensome.  These 
factors also would allow the Court to eliminate the Roth/Perry 
approach’s perverse incentives, show greater deference to state and 
local officials, and assert the primacy of federal constitutional law. 
B. Implementation: The Incidental Benefit and Intended Benefit 
Factors 
The incidental benefit and intended benefit factors are two possible 
ways to implement the atypical and significant hardship framework.  
The incidental benefit factor is inconsistent with the Court’s due process 
tradition in the public employment context and therefore is not 
applicable to public teachers’ due process rights in employment.  The 
intended benefit factor, however, is a viable method to determine the 
presence of a protected property interest in the public employment 
setting.  If the Court adopted the intended benefit factor, tenured public 
teachers in all states would not have a protected property interest in, or a 
right to due process before removal from, employment. 
1. Overview: Incidental Benefit Factor 
In Gonzales, the Court stated that an individual’s government-
provided interest is not protected if it is merely incidental to the 
provision of traditional government services.257  The Court held that a 
woman did not have a property interest in enforcement of a restraining 
order in part because any benefit from enforcement was merely 
 
257. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766–67 (2005). 
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incidental to the government’s provision of police services.258  
Accordingly, the woman could not claim a due process violation when 
the police did not enforce the restraining order, even though a statute 
appeared to mandate enforcement and the woman did not receive an 
opportunity for a hearing.259 
The Court could derive the incidental benefit factor in the public 
employment context from its analysis in Gonzales, which would 
examine whether an interest created by a source of authority is merely 
incidental to the provision of a traditional government service.  By 
definition, deprivation of an interest that arises as a mere incident to the 
government’s provision of a traditional service does not impose an 
excessive burden.  “Incident” means “something dependent upon, 
appertaining to or subordinate to, or accompanying something of 
greater or principal importance, something arising or resulting from 
something else of greater or principal importance.”260  Similarly, 
“incidental” means “depending upon or appertaining to something else 
as primary; something necessary, appertaining to, or depending upon 
another which is termed the principal; something incidental to the main 
purpose.”261  Therefore, an incidental benefit arising from the provision 
of a traditional government service is secondary to, and of lesser 
importance than, that service.   
Although an incidental benefit may itself be important (the plaintiff 
in Gonzales no doubt valued enforcement of the restraining order), it 
never can be more important than the principal government service.  For 
that reason, the public’s interest in a government service must have 
priority over an individual’s interest in an incidental benefit.  Therefore, 
deprivation of an incidental benefit cannot impose an atypical and 
significant hardship on an individual for due process purposes.  This 
logic could help explain the harsh result in Gonzales.  The public 
interest in vesting enforcement discretion in police officers outweighs 
an individual’s incidental interest in enforcement.  Therefore, in light of 
the totality of the circumstances, the police department’s failure to 
enforce the restraining order did not impose an excessive burden on the 
plaintiff for due process purposes, even though the woman endured 
severe personal hardship.  Accordingly, the woman’s interest in 
enforcement was not protected by procedural due process. 
The incidental benefit factor addresses many of the concerns the 
 
258. Id. at 767. 
259. Id. 
260. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (6th ed. 1994) (emphasis added). 
261. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Court expressed in Conner about the Roth/Perry analysis.262  First, the 
incidental benefit factor would be less likely than the Roth/Perry 
approach to protect an interest when state officials did not primarily 
intend to confer a benefit on a regulated party because barring 
protection of incidental benefits would preclude protection of many 
unintended benefits.  Second, the incidental benefit factor would not 
require close scrutiny of independent sources of authority, thereby 
conserving judicial resources and showing greater deference to state and 
local officials.  Third, because the incidental benefit factor does not 
focus on official discretion, it would not encourage rules that give 
excessive discretion to administrators.  Finally, the incidental benefit 
factor would facilitate the Court’s exercise of constitutional judgment as 
to whether an interest is entitled to procedural due process protection by 
providing a standard to determine whether a source of authority imposes 
an atypical and significant hardship.   
Because the incidental benefit factor responds to the Court’s 
criticisms of the Roth/Perry approach, it could be a way to determine 
whether a property interest is protected by due process. 
2. Overview: Intended Benefit Factor 
The intended benefit factor derives from Conner.263  In Conner, a 
prison regulation did not create a liberty interest in protection from 
solitary confinement in part because the “regulation [was] primarily 
designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison 
[and was] not designed to confer rights on inmates.”264  Thus, an 
important factor in the Court’s conclusion that the prisoner did not have 
a liberty interest was that state officials did not primarily intend to 
benefit prisoners by requiring a finding of guilt based on substantial 
evidence in disciplinary hearings.265  The intended benefit factor would 
inquire whether officials who crafted a source of authority primarily 
intended to confer a right or benefit on a regulated individual or class of 
people.  If so, then the Due Process Clause would protect the regulated 
parties’ interest; if not, then the regulated parties would not be entitled 
to due process before government deprivation of that interest. 
Although the Conner Court did not articulate a relationship between 
official intent and the atypical and significant hardship standard, one 
can infer such a connection.  On the one hand, if state officials in 
Conner had primarily intended to benefit prisoners by protecting them 
 
262. See supra Part IV.B. 
263. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995). 
264. Id. (emphasis added).   
265. See id. 
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from solitary confinement, then “in relation to the ordinary incidents of 
prison life,” deprivation of that protection would be an atypical and 
significant hardship.  On the other hand, if (as the Court found) state 
officials primarily intended the regulation to guide prison 
administration, then solitary confinement is consistent with the 
experience of prison life and consequently not an excessive burden.  
Therefore, determining whether officials primarily intended to confer a 
benefit on a person claiming a protected interest could be a factor used 
to decide whether deprivation of that interest imposes an atypical and 
significant hardship. 
The intended benefit factor effectively responds to the Court’s 
concerns about the Roth/Perry approach.  First, by definition, the 
intended benefit factor would not require due process when officials did 
not intend to confer a benefit on an individual.  Second, the intended 
benefit factor would show greater deference to state officials by 
enforcing their intent.  Third, focusing on official intent instead of 
discretion would not create a perverse incentive to give state and local 
officials excessive discretion.266  Rather, the intended benefit factor 
would encourage officials to express their intent when crafting statutes 
or regulations, which in turn would give all parties notice of the 
presence or absence of a protected interest.  Such notice would reduce 
uncertainty and disputes about constitutional protection.  Finally, the 
intended benefit factor is a way to channel the Court’s prerogative to 
determine whether federal constitutional law protects an interest. 
Therefore, the Court could consider whether states primarily intended 
to confer a benefit on public teachers by linking teachers’ employment 
to performance measures based largely on student achievement. 
C. Application of Intended Benefit and Incidental Benefit Factors 
This Section applies the incidental benefit and intended benefit 
factors to the six state schemes examined in this Article.  While the 
incidental benefit factor is inconsistent with the Court’s due process 
 
266. One could argue that a focus on intent merely would shift discretion and the potential for 
unfair decisions from local officials to judges.  Admittedly, judicial inquiries into legislative 
intent are not purely objective and can be manipulated.  However, courts have institutional 
experience construing a drafter’s intent in statutes and other documents.  Settled principles of 
interpretation guide courts’ analysis.  Without maligning local officials or exaggerating judges’ 
virtue, it is fair to say that judges are more likely to exercise discretion responsibly.  Additionally, 
local officials’ discretion over regulated parties is different than judicial discretion to interpret 
legislative intent because legislatures are in a better position than regulated parties to protect 
themselves from abusive or erroneous exercise of discretion.  If the Court began to apply the 
intended benefit factor, legislatures could enact statutory schemes with substantive terms that 
clearly define intended beneficiaries. 
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tradition in the public employment setting, application of the intended 
benefit factor would deny tenured public teachers of a protected 
property interest in employment. 
1. Incidental Benefit Factor: Inconsistent with Due Process Tradition 
The Court could use the incidental benefit factor to determine 
whether an independent source of authority imposes an atypical and 
significant hardship on public teachers’ interest in employment.  In 
Gonzales, the Court found no protected property interest in enforcement 
of a restraining order because such enforcement is merely incidental to 
the provision of a traditional government service.267  Like policing, 
public education is a traditional government service, and like 
enforcement of a restraining order, the employment of teachers is 
merely incidental to educating children.  Based on the Court’s reasoning 
in Gonzales, public teachers’ interest in employment is not protected by 
due process. 
However, the incidental benefit factor would preclude nearly all 
public employees who perform functions “that government actors have 
always performed”268 from claiming a protected property interest in 
employment, which is inconsistent with the Court’s due process 
tradition in the public employment context.  The incidental benefit 
factor is tantamount to a categorical rule against due process protection 
of public employment, but the Court never has categorically denied 
public employees such protection.  Moreover, the incidental benefit 
factor reflects a balancing of the government’s interest and the 
individual’s interest, which also is inconsistent with the Court’s due 
process tradition in the public employment context.  Unlike the Court’s 
First Amendment tradition governing public employees,269 the Court’s 
procedural due process tradition has not relied on balancing.  Rather, the 
Court has attempted to define the nature of an interest and its value to 
the person seeking protection, including by examining whether an 
interest is a right or a privilege,270 is something to which a person has a 
legitimate claim of entitlement,271 or is something that, if deprived, 
would impose on a person an atypical and significant hardship.272  
Although the incidental benefit factor may appear to characterize the 
relative value of an interest by deeming it “incidental,” or secondary, by 
 
267. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766–68 (2005). 
268. Id. at 766–67. 
269. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra Part I.B–C (summarizing Roth and Perry). 
272. See supra notes 67–71 (explaining Conner’s atypical and significant hardship test). 
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reference to a traditional government service, in effect the incidental 
benefit factor categorically would preclude due process protection of 
public employment without attempting to evaluate the nature and 
importance of the interest itself.  Accordingly, the incidental benefit 
factor is inconsistent with the Court’s due process tradition in the public 
employment context and is not a viable method to implement the 
atypical and significant hardship framework in the context of public 
teachers’ employment. 
2. Intended Benefit Factor: The Demise of Teachers’                       
Due Process Rights 
Rather than adopting the incidental benefit factor analysis, the Court 
could apply Conner’s intended benefit factor in the public employment 
context.  To determine whether statutory performance-based 
employment schemes impose an atypical and significant hardship on 
tenured public teachers’ interest in employment, the Court would 
determine whether the legislature primarily intended to confer a benefit 
on teachers.273  If the Court were to focus on individual statutory 
provisions, such as those limiting the grounds for dismissal of tenured 
teachers in all six states examined herein, it could find a primary intent 
to benefit tenured teachers.  However, application of the intended 
benefit factor to a single provision is inconsistent with the atypical and 
significant hardship framework, which is based on the totality of the 
circumstances.274  Any examination of legislative intent should 
encompass the entire statutory scheme.275  Accordingly, the following 
Subsections evaluate whether each state’s laws demonstrate that the 
legislature primarily intended to benefit tenured public teachers. 
In sum, all of the schemes examined in this Article show that the 
legislature primarily intended to benefit students, not teachers.  This 
conclusion is rooted in a common feature of those schemes: teacher 
 
273. This analysis focuses on statutory evidence of primary intent to confer a benefit or right 
on public teachers.  A court could examine other sources to infer intent to confer a benefit on 
teachers, such as regulations promulgated pursuant to authorizing legislation.  At the time this 
Article was researched and drafted, regulations to implement state statutory schemes were in 
varying stages of development.  Moreover, within a state, regulations could differ among school 
districts.  Therefore, for illustrative purposes, a statutory analysis permits the most comprehensive 
and expedient comparative analysis of application of the intended benefit factor. 
274. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–87 (1995). 
275. For example, in Conner, the Court decided that a prison regulation did not give rise to a 
procedural due process right after evaluating the conditions imposed on a prisoner as a result of 
the totality of applicable rules and regulations.  Id. at 485–87.  The Court found that the 
regulation did not impose an atypical and significant hardship because, in the context of 
applicable prison regulations, the hardship imposed by the regulation at issue was not so severe as 
to deprive the prisoner of liberty for due process purposes.  Id. 
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performance evaluations that are based in large part on the learning 
growth or achievement of students.  Although some state provisions 
benefit teachers by providing professional development opportunities 
intended to improve teachers’ skills and enhance job security, these 
benefits are not ends in themselves.  Rather, they are means to achieve 
the primary purpose of benefitting students by improving student 
performance.  Because none of the schemes primarily intend to benefit 
tenured teachers, dismissal of public teachers based on performance 
evaluations would not impose an atypical and significant hardship on 
those teachers, and they would not have a property interest in 
employment protected by due process. 
i. Illinois 
Of the six states examined in this Article, the primary intent of 
Illinois’ scheme is the most ambiguous.  Beyond Illinois’ just-cause 
dismissal provision,276 several provisions suggest the legislature’s intent 
to benefit teachers.  Illinois provides relatively robust professional 
development opportunities to teachers who receive poor performance 
evaluation ratings.  A teacher who receives a “needs improvement” 
rating must receive a professional development plan within thirty 
days.277  Similarly, a teacher who receives an “unsatisfactory” rating 
must be given a remediation plan within thirty days if the evaluator 
deems the teacher’s deficiencies remediable.278  Professional 
development and remediation plans give teachers a blueprint to improve 
their skills279 and also can protect teachers from removal based on an 
“unsatisfactory” rating.280 Those professional development 
opportunities clearly are intended to benefit teachers. 
Unlike most other states, the Illinois legislature also sought to protect 
teachers by giving them a role in the layoff and recall process.  Every 
school district must create a committee of school board members and 
teachers to oversee layoff and recall procedures and to assure that 
teachers with seniority are not targeted unfairly for layoffs.281  The 
committee has the power to adjust the groupings of teachers used to 
determine the order of layoffs and recalls.282  Therefore, although layoff 
and recall priorities are determined largely by performance evaluation 
 
276. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a), 10-22.4 (West 2012). 
277. Id. § 5/24A-5(h).   
278. Id. § 5/24A-5(i).   
279. See id. § 5/24A-5(h)–(i). 
280. See id. § 5/24A-5(m). 
281. Id. § 5/24-12(c). 
282. Id.   
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ratings,283 the Illinois legislature also intended to protect teachers from 
pretextual layoffs.284 
These intended benefits to teachers, however, are offset by the 
composition of teachers’ performance evaluation ratings, which shows 
that the Illinois legislature designed its scheme primarily to benefit 
students.  The Illinois scheme requires that measures of student growth 
be a “significant factor in the rating of a teacher’s performance.”285  
Mandating that student growth be a significant factor in teachers’ 
evaluations reframes the scheme’s professional development 
opportunities as a means to accomplish an end other than enhancing 
teachers’ skills and protecting teachers from removal: improving 
student outcomes.  In context, professional development is valuable 
only to the extent that it benefits students by improving student test 
scores.   
Still, as compared to other states, Illinois’ regime is favorable to 
teachers.  Other states require that at least fifty percent of teachers’ 
evaluations be based on student growth or performance.  By contrast, 
“significant factor” is a vague term that permits Illinois school districts 
to decide how much weight to give to student growth, which does not 
preclude making student growth less than fifty percent of a teacher’s 
evaluation.  A performance evaluation scheme that provides 
professional development opportunities and gives majority weight to 
factors other than student performance—such as qualitative assessments 
of teachers’ preparation, classroom management, and pedagogy—could 
be construed as demonstrating a primary intent to benefit teachers.  Yet, 
in the totality of the circumstances, making student outcomes a 
“significant factor” in teachers’ performance evaluations is sufficient to 
show that the primary purpose of the evaluation scheme is to benefit 
students, and that any benefit to teachers is merely a means to that end. 
Furthermore, school officials may dismiss teachers on the basis of 
performance without developing a remediation plan when a teacher has 
irremediable deficiencies.286  Evaluators decide whether deficiencies 
are “irremediable” and therefore have the power to remove teachers 
with poor performance ratings without providing a remediation plan.287  
That power erodes the professional development and job security 
benefit of remediation plans and shows that the legislature intended to 
give evaluators the power to accomplish the primary goal of improving 
 
283. Id. § 5/24 12(b). 
284. See id. § 5/24-12(c). 
285. Id. § 5/24A-5(c).   
286. Id. § 5/24A-5(n).   
287. See id. 
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student growth without the unintended consequence of protecting 
teachers with irremediable deficiencies. 
 Making student test scores a significant factor in teacher evaluations 
is part of an effort to hold teachers accountable for objective educational 
outputs, not merely the quality of inputs.  Students, not teachers, are the 
primary intended beneficiaries of the Illinois scheme.  Therefore, 
removing tenured teachers on the basis of performance pursuant to that 
scheme would not impose an atypical and significant hardship on 
teachers that would trigger due process protection of employment. 
ii. Michigan 
Although Michigan’s scheme includes several provisions that benefit 
teachers, the totality of the circumstances shows that the Michigan 
legislature primarily intended to benefit students, such that removal of 
teachers based upon performance evaluation ratings would not impose 
an atypical and significant hardship. 
Some provisions protect teachers from removal and provide 
opportunities for teachers to improve their skills.  Similar to just-cause 
dismissal provisions in other states, Michigan prohibits arbitrary and 
capricious dismissal of teachers,288 which offers relative job security 
compared to at-will employment.  Additionally, Michigan provides 
teachers with robust professional development opportunities to enhance 
their skills and protect them from adverse employment decisions.289  
Indeed, Michigan’s scheme aims to assure that teachers “are given 
ample opportunities for improvement.”290  Evaluations should be used 
to retain and cultivate teachers, including by “providing relevant 
coaching, instruction support, or professional development.”291  
Although evaluations also should be used to remove ineffective tenured 
teachers, such removal should occur only after teachers “have had 
ample opportunities to improve.”292 
Accordingly, evaluations should provide “timely and constructive 
feedback.”293  To this end, annual year-end evaluations must include 
specific performance goals, developed in consultation with teachers, 
designed to improve effectiveness.294  Evaluations also must 
 
288. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.101 (West 2011). 
289. Id. § 380.1249(1)(a)–(d). 
290. Id.  
291. Id.   
292. Id.   
293. Id. 
294. Id. § 380.1249(2)(a)(iii).   
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recommend training.295  Teachers who receive “minimally effective” or 
“ineffective” ratings must receive an “individualized development 
plan,” also developed with the teacher.296  Such teachers also must 
receive a mid-year evaluation based on that plan which sets 
performance goals for the remainder of the school year, recommends 
additional training, and results in a written improvement plan “to assist 
the teacher to improve his or her rating.”297  Michigan further 
encourages school districts to provide mentors or coaches to teachers 
who receive “ineffective” or “minimally effective” ratings.298  
Collectively, these provisions show the strongest commitment of any 
state examined in this Article to helping teachers develop professionally 
and avoid dismissal on the basis of performance, which weighs strongly 
in favor of finding that the Michigan legislature intended to benefit 
teachers. 
However, Michigan makes student achievement the predominant 
basis for teachers’ performance ratings, which shows that Michigan’s 
commitment to professional development is primarily intended to 
benefit students.  The relative significance of data on student 
achievement starts at twenty-five percent of a teacher’s rating during the 
2013–2014 school year and increases to fifty percent during and after 
the 2015–2016 school year.299  This phased process may be intended to 
protect teachers from any adverse effects of the evaluation system’s 
initial implementation.  Nevertheless, by choosing to make student 
achievement fifty percent of the measure of teacher performance, the 
legislature demonstrated that evaluating and enhancing teachers’ skills 
primarily is a means to help students. 
Michigan’s layoff and recall provisions further reveal that students, 
not teachers, are the primary intended beneficiaries of teacher 
performance evaluations.  Layoffs and recalls must be based on 
“retaining effective teachers” and must assure that teachers with 
“ineffective” ratings do not get preference over those with higher 
ratings.300  The majority basis for layoff and recall decisions must be 
individual teacher performance, which is determined predominantly by 
evidence of student growth.301  Michigan’s layoff and recall provisions 
further demonstrate that the state’s performance evaluation system, 
 
295. Id. 
296. Id. § 380.1249(2)(b)(i)–(iii).   
297. Id.    
298. Id. 
299. Id. § 380.1249(2)(a)(i).   
300. Id. § 380.1248(1)(b).   
301. Id. § 380.1248(1)(b)(i)(A)–(D). 
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including professional development opportunities, is designed primarily 
to benefit students.  Accordingly, depriving tenured teachers of 
employment would not impose an atypical and significant hardship on 
teachers giving rise to an interest in employment protected by due 
process. 
iii. Colorado 
Although Colorado’s scheme includes provisions more favorable to 
teachers as compared to the schemes in Illinois and Michigan, other 
provisions show that the legislature intended primarily to benefit 
students rather than teachers.  Like other states, Colorado’s just-cause 
dismissal provision gives teachers job security compared to at-will 
employment.302  The Colorado scheme also gives teachers some 
protection in the event of layoffs by requiring school districts to include 
teachers in policymaking related to layoff decisions.303  Additionally, 
one express purpose of Colorado’s performance evaluation system is to 
measure teachers’ professional growth and development.304  The 
legislature created a “council for educator effectiveness” to give 
teachers “meaningful opportunity” to improve performance and share 
“effective practices” with other teachers.305  All evaluations must 
include an “improvement plan” that recommends how to enhance 
performance, including through education and training.306  Teachers 
who receive “ineffective” ratings may be given a remediation plan and 
the opportunity to improve their rating.307  These provisions augment 
teachers’ skills and protect them from removal based upon performance. 
However, other Colorado provisions provide context that shows that 
the legislature primarily intended to benefit students.  Another purpose 
of the council for educator effectiveness is to assure that at least fifty 
percent of teacher evaluations are based on measures of student 
academic growth.308  Another provision independently requires that 
student academic growth make up fifty percent of teachers’ ratings.309  
Moreover, the goal of teachers’ evaluations is to “improve[e] student 
academic growth.”310 Accordingly, Colorado’s professional 
 
302. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-301 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of First Reg. Sess. 
Gen. Assembly (2013)). 
303. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(III)(B). 
304. Id. § 22-9-106(1)(d). 
305. Id. § 22-9-105.5(2)(c). 
306. Id. § 22-9-106(3)(a)–(b). 
307. Id. § 22-9-106(4.5)(b). 
308. Id. § 22-9-105.5(2)(c).   
309. Id. § 22-9-106(1)(e)(II). 
310. Id. § 22-9-105.5(3)(a).   
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development measures ultimately and primarily are intended to benefit 
students. 
Other Colorado provisions further undercut any argument that the 
legislature primarily intended to benefit teachers.  One provision bars 
the use of seniority to determine whom to layoff, except as a tie breaker 
and only if doing so “is in the best interest of the students enrolled in the 
school district.”311  More significantly, principals may refuse to fill job 
vacancies with even well-qualified applicants, showing that providing 
teachers job security was not the primary intent of Colorado’s 
scheme.312  Although rejected teachers who have an “effective rating” 
are placed in a “priority hiring pool,”313 even those teachers are placed 
on unpaid leave after the longer of twelve months or two hiring 
cycles.314  Therefore, although teachers technically can be dismissed 
only for just cause, including poor performance, principals can bar even 
highly rated teachers from active service and relegate them to an unpaid 
status that is similar to unemployment.  This power undercuts teachers’ 
real job security and calls into question whether the legislature intended 
to confer any such benefit at all.  As a result, deprivation of tenured 
teachers’ employment pursuant to Colorado’s scheme does not impose 
an atypical and significant hardship that triggers procedural due process 
rights. 
iv. Idaho 
Compared to Illinois, Michigan, and Colorado, few Idaho provisions 
could be construed as conferring a benefit on teachers.  As in other 
states, teachers may not be suspended or dismissed at will,315 which 
gives teachers a measure of job security during a contract term.  
Additionally, teachers with grandfathered tenure status have a right to 
contract renewal,316 but the benefit of that right is diluted by the board 
of trustees’ unilateral power to change the salary and duration of a 
renewable contract.317 Although these provisions give teachers some 
job security, they do not show strong legislative intent to benefit 
teachers. 
 
311. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV) (emphasis added).   
312. See id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(I).   
313. See id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(III)(A) (“Any active nonprobationary teacher who was 
deemed effective during the prior school year and has not secured a mutual consent placement 
shall be a member of a priority hiring pool . . . .”). 
314. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV).   
315. IDAHO CODE § 33-513(5) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/ 
Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session).   
316. Id. § 33-515(2).   
317. Id. § 33-515(3). 
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More glaringly, the legislature attempted to deny teachers procedural 
due process protection by expressly disclaiming any property interest in 
teachers’ employment.  Under the intended benefit factor analysis, these 
disclaimers are clear evidence of legislative intent.318  Although a 
federal court, not the state, ultimately has the power to determine 
whether federal constitutional law recognizes a protected interest,319 the 
intended benefit factor seeks to honor legislative intent.  Idaho’s 
disclaimers are highly relevant to application of the intended benefit 
factor.  Absent countervailing substantive evidence of legislative intent 
primarily to confer a benefit on teachers, the Idaho legislature’s express 
disclaimer of any protected property interest is sufficient to find that the 
legislature did not primarily intend to benefit teachers. 
Moreover, the substance of Idaho’s scheme shows that the legislature 
primarily intended to benefit students.  Teacher performance ratings in 
Idaho must be at least fifty percent based on “objective measures of 
growth in student achievement.”320  Idaho’s predominant focus on 
student achievement demonstrates that evaluating and improving 
teacher performance primarily is a means to improve students’ 
educational growth.  This student-focused mentality, combined with 
Idaho’s express intent not to give teachers a protected property interest 
in employment, shows that the legislature primarily intended to benefit 
students, not teachers.  Thus, depriving tenured teachers of employment 
based upon performance would not impose an atypical and significant 
hardship on teachers that would give rise to a protected interest in 
employment. 
v. Florida 
The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the Florida 
legislature primarily intended its scheme governing public teacher 
employment to benefit students.  Nevertheless, some provisions benefit 
teachers.  Like the other states analyzed in this Article, Florida’s scheme 
limits dismissal of teachers to “just cause,”321 which gives Florida 
 
318. Whereas under the Roth/Perry approach, such disclaimers may not be effective to 
prevent creation of a property interest.  One of the Court’s chief complaints in Conner about the 
Roth/Perry approach was the possibility that an independent source of authority inadvertently 
could create a property interest in a benefit, even when a state did not intend to confer that benefit 
on the regulated party.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995).  Application of the 
Roth/Perry approach to the Idaho scheme could lead to just that disfavored result.  By contrast, 
application of the intended benefit factor would avoid that result, which further supports the 
conclusion that the Court could abandon the Roth/Perry analysis and use the intended benefit 
factor to determine the presence of due process rights in the public employment context. 
319. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005). 
320. IDAHO CODE § 33-514(4). 
321. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.335(4) (West 2011).   
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teachers job security during the term of their employment contract.  
Additionally, certain provisions give teachers modest professional 
development benefits.  School districts should provide “appropriate” 
professional development opportunities, and must provide 
recommendations and support to teachers who receive poor ratings to 
help improve performance.322  Florida’s scheme also involves teachers 
in the process of forming evaluation standards.323  These provisions 
grant benefits that enhance teachers’ professional skills and job security.   
However, compared to Illinois and Michigan in particular, Florida’s 
professional development provisions are vague, leaving the details to 
local school districts that may not implement effective professional 
development programs.324  Moreover, Florida’s emphasis on teacher 
assistance and support is comparatively modest.  Therefore, although 
Florida’s regime includes professional development that may benefit 
teachers, Florida’s commitment to professional development is 
relatively weak. 
Other provisions strongly suggest that the Florida legislature 
primarily intended to benefit students, not teachers.  Florida’s scheme 
evaluates teacher performance “for the purpose of increasing student 
learning growth by improving the quality of instructional, 
administrative, and supervisory services.”325  Florida makes explicit 
that teacher enrichment is a means to benefit students, not a free-
standing goal that primarily benefits teachers (whereas this provision 
can only be inferred from other states’ regimes).  This relationship 
between enhancing instruction and improving student learning growth 
recurs throughout Florida’s scheme.  Moreover, the evaluation system 
must support effective instruction, student learning growth, and include 
a process for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the system 
in carrying out its goals.326 
Other provisions also show that Florida’s scheme was not primarily 
intended to benefit teachers.  Similar to Michigan, Colorado, and Idaho, 
at least fifty percent of teacher evaluations must be based on student 
learning growth.327  Also, all teachers hired after July 1, 2011, must 
initially receive one-year contracts.328  Although teachers in Florida 
 
322. Id. § 1012.34(2)(b). 
323. Id. § 1012.34(2)(e).   
324. Id. § 1012.34(2)(b).   
325. Id. § 1012.34(1)(a) (emphasis added).   
326. Id. § 1012.34(2)(a), (h). 
327. Id. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1).  If less than three years of data about students is available, the 
percentage may be reduced to not less than forty percent.  Id. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1)(a). 
328. Id. § 1012.335(2)(c).   
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may not be dismissed during a contract term without just cause, renewal 
of annual contracts depends on a district superintendent’s 
recommendation and satisfaction of performance-based conditions.329  
Moreover, the school board need not renew a teacher’s contract even if 
the teacher receives a recommendation and qualifying performance 
ratings.330  As a result, Florida teachers have little job security, which 
strongly suggests that teachers are not the primary intended beneficiary 
of Florida’s performance-evaluation scheme.  Finally, in the event of 
layoffs, school employees must be retained based on “educational 
program needs” and performance evaluations, with lowest-performing 
employees released first.331  This provision focuses on how best to meet 
the educational needs of students.   
The totality of the circumstances shows that the legislature did not 
intend its scheme primarily to benefit teachers.  Consequently, 
depriving teachers of employment pursuant to that scheme would not 
impose an atypical and significant hardship that would give teachers 
due process rights in employment. 
vi. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma’s regime decisively demonstrates that the legislature’s 
primary purpose was to benefit students, not teachers.  Nevertheless, the 
scheme contains some evidence of intent to benefit teachers.  For one, 
Oklahoma’s just-cause provision limits the circumstances under which 
teachers may be dismissed and therefore gives teachers relative job 
security compared to at-will employment.  Additionally, Oklahoma 
gives teachers means to enhance their professional skills.  Similar to 
Illinois, Michigan, and Colorado, Oklahoma incorporates remediation 
plans and instructional coaching into the performance evaluation 
process and requires administrators to make a reasonable effort to assist 
teachers to improve their ratings within a reasonable time.332  These 
provisions tend to support the inference that the legislature intended to 
confer benefits on teachers. 
The Oklahoma scheme also demonstrates the legislature’s desire to 
comply with federal due process requirements based on the current 
Roth/Perry standard.  These provisions, however, are not evidence of 
legislative intent to benefit teachers.  Before removal, tenured teachers 
must receive notice of their right to a hearing, where “the teacher shall 
be entitled to all rights guaranteed under the circumstances by the 
 
329. Id. 
330. See id.   
331. Id. § 1012.33(5).   
332. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-101.16(B)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
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United States Constitution and the Constitution of Oklahoma.”333  The 
purpose of such hearings is to ensure “the essential pretermination due 
process requirements of notice and an opportunity to respond.”334    
While these provisions recognize constitutional protection “guaranteed 
to teachers under the circumstances,”335 they do not purport to create 
any independent substantive benefit.  Therefore, these requirements are 
not relevant to application of the intended benefit factor, which inquires 
into the legislature’s intent to benefit teachers, not the legislature’s 
understanding of tenured teachers’ due process rights under the 
Roth/Perry approach.336 
Elsewhere, the Oklahoma scheme makes student academic 
performance the top priority, thus clearly demonstrating a primary 
intent to benefit students rather than teachers.  The performance 
evaluation system’s purpose is to “provide feedback to improve student 
learning and outcomes.”337  The required composition of teachers’ 
performance ratings corroborates that purpose.  Half of a teacher’s 
performance rating must be based on quantitative factors: thirty-five 
percent of the rating must be based on “student academic growth” data, 
and fifteen percent must be based on “other academic 
measurements.”338  The other half of each rating must be based on 
qualitative components, including “observable and measurable 
classroom practices that are correlated to student performance 
success.”339  Thus, unlike the other states discussed in this Article, in 
which student academic growth or achievement must be fifty percent or 
less of a teacher’s performance rating, in Oklahoma nearly all of a 
teacher’s performance rating is correlated to student outcomes.  This 
feature unambiguously demonstrates a primary intent to benefit 
students, not teachers.   
As a result, removing tenured teachers for poor performance would 
not be an atypical and significant hardship that would give teachers an 
interest in employment protected by due process. 
 
333. Id. § 70-6-101.26(A) (emphasis added). 
334. Id. § 6-101.3(6) (eff. July 1, 2012). 
335. Id. § 70-6-101.26(A) (emphasis added). 
336. The Oklahoma legislature could not have intended its recognition of tenured teachers’ 
procedural due process rights under the Roth/Perry approach to confer any due process right on 
teachers.  It would have known that whether teachers have a protected interest in employment is 
not determined by the process to which teachers are entitled.  See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).   
337. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-101.16(B)(2) (emphasis added). 
338. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(4)(a).   
339. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(5) (emphasis added).   
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CONCLUSION 
Conner and Gonzales clearly indicate the Court’s dissatisfaction with 
the Roth/Perry approach.  The question for the Court is how it can 
address concerns about the Roth/Perry method in the context of public 
teachers’ employment interest without departing from its due process 
tradition and diminishing its institutional integrity.  The categorical 
rules depriving public employees of speech and class-of-one equal 
protection rights in Ceballos and Engquist, respectively, if imported to 
the due process setting, would suffer from that deficiency.  Fortunately 
for the Court, it can draw upon Conner to develop an alternative 
framework to the Roth/Perry approach that has roots in the Court’s due 
process tradition: the atypical and significant hardship standard 
implemented by the intended benefit factor.  In short, the Court can 
address the flaws it has perceived after forty years of experience with 
the Roth/Perry approach without exposing itself to accusations that it 
has divined a new rule from the ether. 
Although the atypical and significant hardship framework and 
intended benefit factor have roots in due process precedent, departure 
from the Roth/Perry approach nevertheless would likely provoke an 
uproar.  Application of the intended benefit factor would have a 
profound effect on tenured public teachers in many states.  In all six 
states examined in this Article, tenured public teachers would lose due 
process protection of employment.  As more states adopt performance-
based schemes governing employment of public teachers, it is 
reasonable to predict that tenured public teachers in the vast majority of 
states would suffer the same fate.  As recent events in Wisconsin 
demonstrate, at least some state officials may wish to strip public 
teachers of statutory and contractual protections that arose in part from 
the widespread belief following Roth and Perry that tenured public 
teachers have a constitutional right to due process before removal.340  
State fiscal crises could further encourage state officials to reduce the 
amount of process afforded to public teachers, thereby reducing 
administrative costs.  Adoption of the atypical and significant hardship 
standard and intended benefit factor would permit such officials to 
eliminate procedural protections provided by statute and contract.  In 
such an event, tenured public teachers, and perhaps other public 
employees, would have no constitutional backstop to protect their 
 
340. See Peter Whoriskey & Dan Balz, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker’s Victory Deals Blow to 
Unions, WASH. POST (June 6, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-
06/business/35459755_1_unions-collective-bargaining-rights-rights-for-state-workers.  See also 
Tom Cohen, Walker’s Victory Could Bring More Efforts to Weaken Public Unions, CNN (June 6, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/06/politics/wisconsin-recall-unions/index.html.   
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interest in employment. 
In light of this possibility, assuming that tenured public teachers wish 
to retain a protected interest in employment, teacher unions should 
negotiate for provisions in state legislative schemes that demonstrate 
legislative intent primarily to benefit teachers.  From unions’ 
perspective, less than fifty percent of teachers’ evaluation ratings should 
be based on measures of student achievement.  Additionally, union 
leaders should assure that teachers retain just-cause dismissal provisions 
and other mechanisms that give teachers job security.  Finally, unions 
should seek robust professional development and support opportunities, 
especially for teachers who receive low performance ratings, that not 
only help teachers to improve their skills but also insert extra layers of 
protection between a low rating and an adverse employment decision. 
State legislatures, on the other hand, first must decide whether they 
wish to deprive public teachers of due process protection.  Some state 
legislatures, such as those in Idaho and Florida, clearly wish to do so.  
Cynically, one might assume that all legislatures do, if only to reduce 
the administrative costs of providing teachers with the opportunity for a 
hearing.  Some legislatures, however, may not wish to leave teachers 
unprotected for political or policy reasons.  Some legislators are closely 
aligned with teachers; others may wish to retain due process protection 
as a benefit to help induce talented individuals to accept relatively low-
paying teaching jobs. 
Legislatures that wish to deny teachers due process protection should 
ensure that their legislative scheme is replete with evidence of a primary 
intent to benefit students, not teachers.  The most effective way to do 
this is to base teachers’ performance ratings largely on student test 
scores.  Official statements of intent also would be relevant evidence 
under the intended benefit factor analysis.  Legislatures that wish to 
preserve teachers’ due process rights should do the opposite. 
The Court’s adoption of the intended benefit factor undoubtedly 
would harm many tenured teachers because they would lose a 
previously possessed constitutional right.  The unanswered question is 
whether that harm will be offset by any gains in student achievement 
brought about by the widespread use of performance-based employment 
schemes.  That question may take many years to answer.  The net social 
gain or loss resulting from the convergence of the intended benefit 
factor and performance-based public teacher employment schemes will 
not be known for some time, if ever. 
 
